Tarpeh v. United States, 62 A.3d 1266

Tarpeh, a certified nursing assistant, transported Frances Young to a dental appointment panel for discussion at WHC in DC.
Young was a 61-year-old stroke patient, paralyzed on the right side, unable to speak, and overweight, without footrests on the wheelchair.
Tarpeh and Young were misdirected to VA hospital, then Tarpeh attempted to move toward WHC, discovering the wheelchair had no footrests and Young’s foot dragged on the ground.
Tarpeh continued pushing Young across the street toward the NRH after realizing the footrests were missing and Young’s foot was dragging.
Young’s foot became severely injured, leading to bleeding and eventual toe amputation; Tarpeh was charged with misdemeanor criminal neglect of a vulnerable adult and convicted.
The trial court found Tarpeh acted with reckless indifference; the appellate court reversed, concluding lack of sufficient evidence of recklessness.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was sufficient evidence of reckless indifference	Tarpeh lacked recklessness, evidence shows no awareness of grave risk.	Tarpeh's continued pushing despite risk demonstrates reckless indifference.	Insufficient evidence of reckless indifference; conviction reversed.
What constitutes recklessness under DC § 22-934	Recklessness includes conscious disregard of substantial risk.	Recklessness requires more than mere failure to exercise ordinary care; requires bad faith or extreme disregard.	Recklessness requires conscious disregard of substantial and unjustified risk with consideration of alternatives.
Need for evidence of higher culpability beyond risk presence	Any disregard suffices if risk is grave and caused harm.	There must be evidence beyond risk existence, such as intent or bad faith.	Record lacked proof of serious aggravating factors or bad faith; not shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Application to facts showing subsequent alternatives	Tarpeh had superior alternatives or supervision to avert harm.	Tarpeh acted under uncertainty and tried to reach help; no clear alternative available.	Presence of risk and lack of better alternatives alone is not proof of recklessness; not enough for conviction.

Jones v. United States, 813 A.2d 220 (D.C.2002) (recklessness requires awareness of grave risk and disregard)
Jackson v. United States, 996 A.2d 796 (D.C.2010) (clarifies indepth assessment of negligence vs recklessness in care cases)
District of Columbia v. Henderson, 710 A.2d 874 (D.C.1998) (serious aggravating factors and bad faith required for reckless disregard)
In re Romansky, 938 A.2d 733 (D.C.2007) (contextual framework for evaluating mixed questions of law and fact)
Stroman v. United States, 878 A.2d 1241 (D.C.2005) (standard for evaluating sufficiency of evidence in criminal neglect cases)
Mattete v. United States, 902 A.2d 113 (D.C.2006) (necessary probative evidence on essential elements)