Tarla Makaeff v. Trump University, Llc
715 F.3d 254
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Plaintiff Makaeff sued Trump University for deceptive business practices; Trump University counterclaimed for defamation.
- The district court denied Makaeff’s anti-SLAPP motion; it held Trump University’s defamation claim not barred and the university not a public figure.
- Trump University is a private, for-profit entity founded by Donald Trump; it heavily marketed its ties to Trump and his persona.
- Trump University conducted aggressive advertising and promotional activities, prompting public controversy about its educational practices.
- California’s anti-SLAPP statute governs pre-trial dismissal for acts in furtherance of free speech; this appeal reviews that ruling de novo and remands for actual malice analysis if appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Trump University a limited public figure for defamation purposes? | Makaeff argues Trump University is not a public figure. | Trump University argues it is a limited public figure due to its advertising and public controversy. | Trump University is a limited public figure. |
| Did Makaeff’s statements arise from protected anti-SLAPP activity about a public issue? | Statements were consumer-protection information about a public concern. | Activities were private disputes not connected to public concern. | Yes, the statements arose from protected activity related to a public issue. |
| If limited public figure, must Trump University show actual malice by Makaeff? | N/A (not applicable here). | Must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. | Remand for determination of actual malice with strict standard. |
| Does California Civil Code § 47(b) litigation privilege shield Makaeff’s statements? | Statements were communications in the course of litigation or related to litigation. | Privilege should bar the defamation claim. | No, the statements are not protected by § 47(b) in this context. |
| Should the district court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion be reversed and remanded? | District court correctly denied; no public-figure status and no malice shown yet. | Anti-SLAPP dismissal should be sustained if improper. | REVERSED; REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (establishes actual malice standard for public figures)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (defines public figure categories and malice standard)
- Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (anti-SLAPP framework and collateral-order considerations)
- Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) (discovery limits under anti-SLAPP; standard of 'reasonable probability')
- Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal.App.4th 883 (Cal. App. 2004) (consumer-protection information as public-interest话)
- Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (public controversy requires real dispute affecting public)
- Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980) (advertising blitz can render a defendant a limited public figure)
- Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 25 Cal.3d 763 (Cal. 1979) (advertising alone may not render parties public figures)