Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394

Background

Mary Tardif, an epileptic and Occupy Wall Street protester, was arrested March 17, 2012, told officers her Lamictal was in her backpack, was transported for medical clearance, but experienced delay in receiving medication and later had a seizure while in NYPD custody.
On March 21, 2012, Tardif had two separate physical encounters with NYPD: (1) early‑morning with Sgt. Giovanni Mattera, who grabbed her and she fell, sustaining a concussion; (2) afternoon with Sgt. Thomas McManus, whom Tardif says pushed her off crutches (McManus denied contact).
Tardif sued the City, NYPD and officers alleging (a) Title II ADA failure to provide reasonable accommodation (timely medication) and (b) state law assault and battery by the two sergeants (Mattera sued via respondeat superior claim against the City; McManus sued individually).
The district court granted summary judgment to the City on the ADA claim and submitted the assault/battery claims to a jury; the jury sided with the City and officers. Tardif appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the ADA claim (no evidence delay occurred “by reason of” her disability). It held a justification defense applies to non‑arrest crowd‑control force under New York law but the jury instruction incorrectly invited consideration of officers’ subjective intent.
The court found the subjective‑intent jury instruction prejudicial as to Mattera (ordering a new trial on the respondeat superior claim based on his conduct) but harmless as to McManus; it also affirmed evidentiary rulings limiting sympathy‑type background testimony.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
ADA Title II reasonable‑accommodation causation: whether delay in providing medication states a Title II claim	Tardif: City failed to accommodate her epilepsy by delaying medication, violating Title II	City: delay/medical handling were not caused "by reason of" disability; at most inadequate treatment, not ADA discrimination	Affirmed for City. Plaintiff failed to show the delay was substantially caused by her disability, so no Title II violation
Availability of a justification/public‑duty defense under NY law for use of force in non‑arrest settings	Tardif: justification applies only to arrest‑related force; non‑arrest force must give rise to assault/battery liability	City: NY law allows use of objectively reasonable force in performance of public duties (including crowd control)	Held for City. NY law permits a justification inquiry (objective reasonableness) in non‑arrest public‑duty contexts
Jury instruction on justification: whether subjective intent (good faith vs. malice) may be considered in assessing reasonableness	Tardif: subjective intent has no place; New York follows objective Fourth Amendment standard	City: instruction reflected relevant factors (but conceded error on subjective language)	Error. Instruction improperly allowed subjective intent to bear on reasonableness; reversal/remand warranted as to Mattera claim where prejudice likely; harmless as to McManus where intent was not at issue
Trial evidentiary ruling limiting sympathetic background testimony	Tardif: excluded background (adoption, refugee children, interpreter work) was needed to rebut motive attack	City: such testimony would unfairly elicit juror sympathy and waste time	Held for City. District court did not abuse discretion; probative value outweighed by Rule 403 concerns

Key Cases Cited

Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasonable‑accommodation claims require disability to be a substantial cause of denial of services)
Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (ADA does not reach disputes over the substance of medical services absent discrimination)
United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) (Section 504/Title II principles limit disability‑based claims where disability gives rise to need for services)
Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir. 1992) (Rehabilitation Act/ADA does not create a cause of action for services that are directly related to the disability)
Kiman v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 451 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2006) (distinguished — prolonged, routine denial of meds supported different outcome; not controlling here)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden allocation principles)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) (use‑of‑force analysis is an objective reasonableness inquiry; subjective intent immaterial)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (U.S. 2015) (clarified objective standard for pretrial‑detainee excessive‑force claims)
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (introduced multi‑factor excessive‑force analysis; later refined by Graham and Kingsley)
Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1988) (N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 justification maps to objective reasonableness inquiry)