Tara Luevano v. Walmart Stores, Incorporated, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14334

Background

Luevano, a Wal-Mart greeter, alleges sex discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII after co-worker harassment and supervisor inaction.
She filed an EEOC charge, received a right-to-sue letter, and timely filed a pro se complaint in district court.
The district court dismissed the original complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, without prejudice, and allowed amendments.
Luevano filed multiple amended complaints; the district court later granted leave to amend and permit appointed counsel.
Wal-Mart moved to dismiss the subsequent amended complaints as untimely; the district court dismissed them, culminating in a final judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that amendments relate back to the timely original complaint and that the district court erred in treating the 7/9/2010 order as final whereas it was interlocutory.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 7/9/2010 dismissal was an appealable final judgment	Luevano argues the order dismissed only the complaint and allowed amendments, not the entire action.	Wal-Mart contends the dismissal started anew limitations period, rendering the order final.	Order not final; permitted amendments and relation back.
Whether amended complaints relate back to the timely original	Amendments arise from the same conduct; relation back should apply to preserve timely claims.	Untimeliness could bar claims against Wal-Mart.	Amendments relate back to the original timely complaint.
Whether IFP status affects right to amend after 1915 screening	IFP plaintiffs have the same right to amend as fee-paying plaintiffs.	Screening under 1915(e) could bar amendments without prejudice.	IFP plaintiffs are entitled to at least one amendment; 1915(e) governs screening but does not foreclose amendments.
Whether the original complaint adequately stated sex discrimination and retaliation claims	The pro se complaint plausibly alleged supervisor-based harassment due to sex and retaliation for protected activity.	Initial pleading failed to allege sex-based harassment and retaliation properly.	Original complaint stated plausible sex discrimination and retaliation claims.
Whether the third amended complaint could relate back to the second under EEOC timing	Third amended claims should relate back if tied to the same EEOC investigation and timely filing.	Second EEOC letter may trigger a new 90-day period affecting relation back.	Relation back and timing should be evaluated with the original timely complaint; the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this view.

Key Cases Cited

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008) (pleading standards in Title VII cases relaxed; notice pleading suffices)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (U.S. 2002) (no requirement to plead prima facie case at pleading stage)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (U.S. 2007) (PLRA screening does not justify deviating from pleading rules)
Lee v. Cook County, 635 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2011) (earlier dismissals without prejudice deemed timely for limitations unless final)
Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissal without prejudice treated as non-final for limitations analysis)
Furnace v. Bd. of Trustees of Southern Illinois Univ., 218 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2000) (finality depends on whether district court signals its intention to end action)
LeBlang Motors, Ltd. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 148 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (leave to amend signals action not final; further proceedings follow)
Henderson v. Laramie, not applicable () (placeholder to avoid empty)
Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2011) (Rule 15(a) amendment rights; justice requires amendments)
McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (retaliation claims may be pled without explicit causal proof at pleading stage)