Tara Crump v. Andrew M. Saul
932 F.3d 567
7th Cir.2019Background
- Tara Crump applied for Social Security disability benefits based on bipolar disorder with psychosis and polysubstance abuse; she has a history of hospitalizations, emergency psychosis, and functional declines (homelessness, arrests).
- Treating psychiatrist Dr. Sajja Babu repeatedly recorded severe-to-moderate GAF scores and opined in 2015 that Crump had essentially no useful ability to function in workplace-related areas (attention, following instructions, managing stress).
- Consultative examiner Dr. Joyce Scully confirmed bipolar disorder with psychosis but observed Crump was attentive and focused during the exam; state reviewers found moderate limits in sustained attention/concentration.
- At the ALJ hearing a vocational expert (VE) testified that work exists for someone limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, but testified that no jobs would exist if the person were off-task 20% of the time or required two unscheduled absences per month.
- The ALJ found Crump had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace (CPP) but adopted an RFC limiting her to simple, routine, repetitive tasks without incorporating the VE’s off-task/unscheduled-absence findings and gave limited weight to Dr. Babu’s opinions.
- The district court affirmed; the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding the RFC and hypotheticals did not adequately account for Crump’s CPP limits and the ALJ improperly disregarded relevant VE and treating-physician evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ALJ’s RFC and hypotheticals adequately accounted for moderate CPP limitations | Crump: ALJ failed to incorporate her moderate CPP limits (off-task time/absences) into the RFC and VE hypothetical | Commissioner: RFC limiting to simple, routine, repetitive tasks suffices and discounting treatment opinion is permissible | Vacated: ALJ erred by relying on a VE opinion that did not account for CPP limits and by not incorporating the VE’s negative opinion about 20% off-task/2 absences into the RFC |
| Whether the ALJ properly weighed treating psychiatrist Dr. Babu’s opinion about work-related limitations | Crump: ALJ improperly discounted Babu’s opinion that she could not reliably sustain work-related concentration and task completion | Commissioner: ALJ permissibly gave little weight to Babu’s opinion based on treatment notes showing attention during visits | Vacated/remand: Discounting Babu compounded RFC error because his work-focused opinion addressed sustained workplace functioning and the ALJ failed to reconcile it with VE testimony |
Key Cases Cited
- Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2015) (RFC and VE hypotheticals must incorporate all medically supported limitations, including CPP)
- Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ must ensure VE is fully apprised of claimant’s limitations; hypotheticals should expressly capture CPP limits)
- DeCamp v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2019) (failure to provide VE adequate basis to evaluate impairments undermines job-availability testimony)
- Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019) (limiting claimant to "simple, repetitive tasks" does not automatically account for CPP deficits)
- O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2010) ("simple, repetitive tasks" is an insufficient catch-all for concentration-related limits)
- Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing when discounting a treating physician’s opinion is permissible)
- Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2019) (harmless-error RFCs where record lacks evidence of CPP limits; distinguished here because medical evidence and testimony support CPP limitations)