428 S.W.3d 492
Ark.2013Background
- Tapp petitions for a writ of certiorari to dissolve an interim suspension pending disbarment proceedings.
- Panel B found Tapp violated multiple Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct in two CPC dockets (2012-047 GFST bankruptcy; 2012-049 Dr. Hurst).
- GFST foreclosure and self-represented bankruptcies were filed pro se; Tapp admitted delaying foreclosure and listing Fenimores as joint debtors without their consent.
- In Hurst matter, client-trust account deficiencies and misrepresentations to the OPC were found; Tapp disputed the facts but admitted bookkeeping lapses.
- Panel B ordered disbarment proceedings and interim suspension; Tapp sought dissolution/modification under section 16(B); the court denied and petitioned for writ under section 16(E).
- Majority adopts a four-factor Trujillo framework (irreparable harm, balancing, public interest, likelihood of significant sanction) to review petitions under section 16(E).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether interim suspension under 16(E) is proper. | Tapp argues standard akin to preliminary injunction; irreparable harm not shown. | Committee contends four-factor Trujillo standard supports suspension. | Interim suspension proper; four-factor test applied. |
| Irreparable harm to the public or clients. | No irreparable harm from continuing suspension. | Misconduct and potential harm justify suspension. | Public and client harm shown; irreparable harm found. |
| Public interest impact of suspension. | Suspension should be modified with restrictions rather than lifted. | Suspension best protects public interest given allegations of misconduct. | Suspension not adverse to public interest; no monitor ordered. |
| Likelihood of a significant sanction at conclusion of proceedings. | Prior discipline suggests possible non-disbarment. | Serious misconduct and prior record indicate significant sanction likely. | Substantial likelihood of significant sanction (including possible disbarment). |
| Appropriateness of using Trujillo factors in Arkansas interim-suspension review. | Adopt and apply similar injunctive standards to protect public/clients. | Trujillo framework correctly governs review. | Trujillo factors adopted and applied to deny writ. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Discipline of Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972 (Utah 2001) (four-factor standard for attorney interim suspension)
- Malvin v. District of Columbia, 466 A.2d 1220 (D.C. 1983) (temporary suspension treated as preliminary injunction in disciplinary context)
- Potter v. City of Tontitown, 371 Ark. 200 (2007) (preliminary-injunction-like analysis in sanctions context)
- Stanley v. Ligon, 374 Ark. 6, 285 S.W.3d 649 (2008) (right to hearing before suspension/recision of license)
- Ligon v. McCullough, 2009 Ark. 165A (Ark. 2009) (sanctions for financial misconduct high; emphasis on client funds)