Tapia, Gilbert Jr., 462 S.W.3d 29

Appellant pleaded guilty (2002) to aggravated assault and received 10 years deferred-adjudication community supervision; he was also serving a concurrent 10-year prison term on another case and was released from prison December 2011.
The State filed a first motion to revoke on March 6, 2012 alleging failure to report, failure to notify change of address, and curfew violation; a PSI prepared March 23, 2012 indicated appellant admitted drug and alcohol use on March 8, 2012.
At the March 27, 2012 hearing the State sought to amend its motion to add drug/alcohol allegations and to continue; defense opposed a continuance and the amendment; the court denied amendment/continuance, found two violations true (failure to report, failure to give address), continued appellant on community supervision, and ordered 21 days county jail. The judge said the State could file a new motion on other violations.
The State filed a second motion to revoke on March 30, 2012 alleging the March 8 drug/alcohol use; at the May 1, 2012 hearing appellant pled true to those allegations, the court adjudicated guilt and sentenced him to five years in TDCJ.
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Rogers v. State, holding due process barred revocation based on violations known at the time of the first hearing but not adjudicated there. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Tapia)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether revocation must be based on violations that occurred or were discovered after the earlier continuation/modification (i.e., cannot later revoke for violations known at earlier hearing)	Revocation here violated due process because drug/alcohol violations were known at first hearing and thus could not be used later	The State may file a separate motion later; not required to "use it or lose it" on known violations; Rogers dicta is distinguishable	Court held no due-process violation on these facts: the second motion alleged newly charged violations (formal notice given) and the judge had intentionally not considered those allegations at the first hearing; reversal of court of appeals and reinstatement of trial court judgment
Whether the requirement to allege known violations is subject to waiver or estoppel	Tapia argued statutory/contract/due-process protections barred later use of those allegations	State argued Tapia acquiesced to the two-hearing process and waived/estopped from complaint	Court declined a bright-line rule, applied case-by-case analysis: refused to adopt rigid "forfeit known violations" rule here; found defense objection and the judge's statements showed the violations would be addressed in a separate motion and that Tapia was not deprived of due process

Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (addresses due-process limits when a court continues probation/hearing and later revokes without new allegations or a new hearing)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (sets minimum procedural due-process requirements for probation revocation)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1972) (fundamental due-process principles for parole/probation revocations)
Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Texas affords revocation procedures greater safeguards than federal minimums)