526 F. App'x 623
6th Cir.2013Background
- Cobb, an African-American female, worked at Compass Intervention Center (Compass) since 2004 as a Community Counselor supervised by Bourgeois and Golden.
- In Sept. 2009 Cobb and Bishop failed to perform required fifteen-minute checks on two boys; an investigation concluded the incident was sexual acting out, not abuse, but surveillance footage showed failures to conduct checks.
- Director of Risk Management Lowery reported the failures to Clarke; Clarke and Patton allegedly decided to fire Cobb and Bishop around Sept. 23, 2009.
- Bishop was fired Sept. 29, 2009; Cobb, who was ill, was excused to Oct. 6, 2009, with a doctor’s note, delaying termination discussions.
- Makepeace-Williams reviewed the termination from HR perspective and suggested timing related to Cobb’s discharge; Cobb alleges she was told of firing through Bourgeois or Makepeace-Williams.
- Cobb filed an EEOC charge, then a DCS report on Oct. 7, 2009; Compass later conducted a termination meeting on Oct. 14, 2009; district court granted summary judgment for Compass on Cobb’s Tennessee common-law retaliatory discharge claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for summary judgment on retaliatory discharge | Gossett governs; plaintiff need only show prima facie case, defendant must negate an element | Either Gossett or McDonnell Douglas framework applies depending on approach | Compass prevails under either framework; dismissal affirmed |
| Causation—whether DCS report was a substantial factor in firing | DCS report influenced termination after Cobb discussed it | Decision to fire occurred mid-to-late September before Cobb contacted DCS | No substantial causal link; fourth element not proven |
| Whether Bourgeois/Makepeace-Williams were decision-makers | Non-decision-makers still affected by statements | Only Patton and Clarke were actual decision-makers | Non-decision-maker statements do not create triable issues; dismissal maintained |
| Ligature of evidence—reliability of schedule and notices | Being scheduled or told to come in shows ongoing employment | Scheduling by Bourgeois does not negate prior termination decision by Patton/Clarke | Scheduling evidence does not create genuine issue about timing of decision |
| Waiver/arguments not raised below | Direct evidence of retaliation not exhausted | Waived for not raised in district court | New direct-evidence theory waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 2010) (McDonnell Douglas framework not required at summary judgment; prove nonmoving party cannot prove essential element)
- Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2002) (Prima facie framework governs retaliatory-discharge claims)
- Anderson v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1993) (Recognized public-policy basis for retaliatory discharge; later nuanced by Gossett)
- Chism v. Mid-S. Milling Co., Inc., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988) (Defined protected activities and public-policy basis for claim)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (Framework for evaluating pretext in discrimination claims)