894 F.3d 449
2d Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiffs (Tanvir, Algibah, Shinwari) are Muslim men lawfully in the U.S. who allege FBI agents pressured them to serve as informants and, when they refused, placed or retained them on the federal "No Fly List," causing travel, economic, reputational, and emotional harms.
- Plaintiffs sued federal officials in official and individual capacities under RFRA and the First Amendment; they sought injunctive relief (official-capacity) and money damages (individual-capacity). Plaintiffs dismissed official-capacity claims, leaving appealable final order dismissing individual-capacity claims.
- The district court dismissed the First Amendment Bivens retaliation claims (not appealed) and held RFRA does not permit money damages against federal officers in their individual capacities.
- On appeal, the Second Circuit considered whether RFRA’s express private right to "obtain appropriate relief against a government," together with RFRA’s definition of "government" (which includes "official[s] (or other person acting under color of law)"), authorizes individual-capacity money damages against federal officers.
- The Second Circuit held RFRA authorizes individual-capacity suits against federal officers and that "appropriate relief" includes money damages here, applying the Franklin presumption that courts may award all appropriate remedies unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise.
- The Court remanded for further proceedings (including resolution of qualified immunity), declining to decide qualified immunity in the first instance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RFRA authorizes suits against federal officers in their individual capacities | RFRA’s definition of "government" expressly includes "official[s] (or other person acting under color of law)," so individual-capacity suits are permitted | The statute’s language refers to "government" in a natural/official-capacity sense; Congress didn’t intend individual-capacity suits | RFRA’s text (and analogy to § 1983 language) authorizes individual-capacity suits against federal officers and others acting under color of federal law |
| Whether RFRA’s phrase "appropriate relief" includes money damages against federal officers in individual capacities | "Appropriate relief" is ambiguous; Franklin presumption favors availability of all appropriate remedies, including damages, absent clear congressional intent to exclude them | Legislative history and precedent (Sossamon/RLUIPA cases) show limits on damages; RFRA was intended only to restore pre-Smith remedies | "Appropriate relief" is ambiguous but Franklin presumption applies; RFRA permits money damages against federal officers in their individual capacities |
| Whether prior cases (Sossamon, RLUIPA decisions) bar damages under RFRA | RFRA differs constitutionally and textually from RLUIPA; sovereign-immunity concerns in those cases don’t apply to individual-capacity suits | Those decisions support reading "appropriate relief" narrowly to exclude damages | Those precedents addressing sovereign immunity or Spending Clause concerns are inapplicable; they do not preclude individual-capacity damages under RFRA |
| Whether qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity damages claims | Plaintiffs: RFRA creates clearly established rights; courts should reach merits | Defendants: (raised later) officers entitled to qualified immunity | Court did not decide qualified immunity on appeal; remanded for district court to address it first |
Key Cases Cited
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (distinguishes official- and individual-capacity suits and notes sovereign immunity does not bar individual-capacity claims)
- Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (presumes availability of all appropriate remedies absent clear congressional indication otherwise)
- Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) (interpreting "appropriate relief" in RLUIPA as not authorizing money damages against a State under sovereign immunity principles)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (describes RFRA’s sweeping coverage and explains limits under Section 5 analysis)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognized an implied damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal agents)
- Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (permitted damages remedies against federal officers absent alternative congressional remedy or special factors counseling hesitation)
- Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (held RFRA authorizes individual-capacity damages against federal officers; applied Franklin presumption)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard cited for 12(b)(6) review)