Tanusantoso v. Barr, 962 F.3d 694

Petitioners Harmanto Tanusantoso and Wiwik Widayati are Indonesian Catholics who applied for asylum in 2001; an IJ denied relief in 2003 and the BIA affirmed in 2004.
Petitioners filed three motions to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel and changed country conditions for Christians; the third motion was filed in 2017.
The 2017 motion included U.S. government reports and news articles documenting increased hostility toward Christians in Indonesia: renewed enforcement of the 1965 anti‑blasphemy law, local imposition of Sharia on non‑Muslims, closures/vandalism of churches, and political targeting of Christian figures.
The BIA issued a one‑and‑a‑half page denial in 2018 that generally asserted the Indonesian government still promoted religious freedom and concluded Petitioners had not shown worsening conditions.
The BIA also denied the motion because Petitioners did not attach a new asylum application, citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
The Second Circuit granted review, held the BIA abused its discretion by failing to address Petitioners’ primary changed‑conditions evidence, and held § 1003.2(c)(1) does not require refiling a duplicative asylum application when one already exists; the case was vacated and remanded for further consideration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the BIA abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen without addressing Petitioners’ changed‑country‑conditions evidence?	Petitioners: BIA failed to consider key, material evidence (State Dept., USCIRF reports, articles) showing deterioration for Christians.	Gov: BIA reasonably concluded conditions had not worsened and need not parse every exhibit.	Yes. BIA abused discretion; it must explicitly consider primary evidence that materially bears on the claim.
Does 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) require submitting a new asylum application with a motion to reopen when an earlier asylum application already exists?	Petitioners: Regulation only requires new application if the motion is "for the purpose of submitting an application for relief;" here Petitioners sought review of an existing application.	Gov: BIA interpreted §1003.2(c)(1) to require a new application with the motion.	No. The regulation does not compel duplicative re‑filing; BIA abused discretion by denying on that ground.

Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (review standard for BIA denial of motion to reopen)
Fong Chen v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2007) (BIA must consider country‑conditions evidence submitted with motion to reopen)
Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (BIA decision cannot be conclusory; must provide reasoned explanation)
Chen v. U.S. INS, 359 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (government reports are reliable sources on country conditions)
Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2007) (BIA must explicitly consider material evidence)
Wang v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 437 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing BIA obligations to address evidence)
Liem v. Attorney General, 921 F.3d 388 (3d Cir. 2019) (BIA required to account for petitioner’s country‑conditions evidence)
Sihotang v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2018) (one‑and‑a‑half page BIA opinion that ignored significant evidence is an abuse of discretion)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (textual interpretation principles; rule against surplusage)
Romero‑Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing motions to reopen generally from those filed to submit a new application)