Tannenbaum v. Shea
133 So. 3d 1056
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Parties (both attorneys) entered an agreed final judgment of dissolution in 1999 that set guideline child support at $828.16/month but required higher monthly payments and other expenses; only the guideline amount was enforceable by contempt.
- The husband frequently failed to pay support and related expenses, prompting repeated enforcement and contempt actions.
- In 2008 the parties filed a settlement and the circuit court entered an "Agreed Order Containing Money Judgment" awarding the wife $70,000 and stating: "Court retains jurisdiction of the action, but not of the money judgment contained herein."
- Three years later the wife sought enforcement of the $70,000 judgment; the husband moved to dismiss enforcement proceedings, citing the Agreed Order’s divestiture of jurisdiction.
- The wife did not timely appeal or seek rehearing of the Agreed Order but asked the court to strike paragraph 7 as void against public policy so she could enforce child-support-related obligations.
- The trial court set aside paragraph 7 under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4) as void; the district court reversed, holding Rule 1.540(b)(4) does not authorize relief because the judgment was at most voidable, not void.
Issues
| Issue | Wife's Argument | Husband's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether paragraph divesting court of jurisdiction over the $70,000 money judgment is void as against public policy because parents cannot contract away child support rights | Paragraph 7 is unenforceable and void; wife should be able to enforce child-support-related judgment in family court | The Agreed Order divested family-court jurisdiction only; wife can still enforce the judgment by suing on the judgment in civil court or by New York remedies | The provision did not eviscerate child support rights or preclude enforcement; it was not void as against public policy |
| Whether Rule 1.540(b)(4) authorizes setting aside the Agreed Order provision that divested jurisdiction | Relief under 1.540(b)(4) is proper because the provision is void (public policy) | 1.540(b)(4) applies only to judgments that are void, not to voidable judgments; relief is improper here | 1.540(b)(4) was improperly applied; the Agreed Order was at most voidable, so the trial court erred in vacating paragraph 7 |
| Whether the wife’s failure to timely appeal or seek rehearing bars her later attack on paragraph 7 | The provision was contrary to law/public policy and may be set aside despite lack of timely appeal | Challenges to errors that affect substance of a final judgment must be raised by timely rehearing or appeal; fraud/mistake claims are time‑barred | The wife’s delay meant claims of mistake/fraud were time‑barred; appellate or timely 1.530 relief was required |
| Whether the wife was deprived of effective remedies to collect support by paragraph 7 | Wife lacked family-court enforcement methods and thus paragraph 7 nullified enforcement avenues | Wife retained separate enforcement options (action on the judgment in civil court; New York remedies); paragraph 7 only precluded family-division collection in that case | Paragraph 7 did not eliminate enforcement remedies and did not render the order void |
Key Cases Cited
- Burshan v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 805 So.2d 835 (discussing action on a judgment as separate cause to obtain independent judgment)
- Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 61 So.3d 1285 (action on judgment form and defenses available post-judgment)
- Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Morley, 570 So.2d 402 (settlement relieving support held contrary to public policy but final judgment was voidable, not void)
- Krueger v. Ponton, 6 So.3d 1258 (distinction between void and voidable judgments under rule 1.540)
- Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 968 So.2d 658 (void judgment is a nullity and may be attacked under rule 1.540(b)(4) at any time)