Tang v. Visnauskas
1:19-cv-00508
| E.D.N.Y | Sep 20, 2019Background
- Plaintiff filed a DHCR "Illusory Sublet" complaint in July 2014 seeking both a lease renewal and rent overcharge refunds (including treble damages); DHCR addressed only the renewal portion.
- DHCR issued an initial decision June 3, 2015 and a final decision January 26, 2016 terminating the proceeding as to the renewal lease.
- Plaintiff alleges property interests in the overcharge refunds and asserts violations of procedural due process and the equal protection clause.
- Plaintiff challenged DHCR’s handling via an Article 78 proceeding in New York Supreme Court and the petition was denied; the district court took judicial notice of those rulings.
- Plaintiff filed this § 1983 action pro se on January 25, 2019 and filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) on September 13, 2019; defendants moved to dismiss and the court treated the filings as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
- The court dismissed the SAC for failure to state a claim and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due Process: Did DHCR’s alleged failure to process overcharge refund violate procedural due process? | Tang says he had a property interest in rent-overcharge refunds and was deprived of pre-deprivation process when DHCR refused to resolve the refund claim. | Defs. argue Tang had an adequate post-deprivation remedy (Article 78) and that an agency’s failure to follow its own rules does not create a federal property interest. | Dismissed: Article 78 was an adequate post-deprivation remedy; state-law procedural violations do not create a federal due-process property interest. |
| Equal Protection (class-of-one): Was Tang intentionally treated differently without rational basis? | Tang alleges "reverse selective enforcement" and discrimination based on race, national origin, citizenship, and tenant status because DHCR didn’t follow Fact Sheet #7 fully. | Defs. contend the claim is untimely and, in any event, Tang’s allegations are conclusory and lack facts showing similarly situated comparators or intentional discriminatory motive. | Dismissed: Court assumed arguendo timeliness but found allegations conclusory and insufficient to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (sets three-factor test for what process is due)
- Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (Mathews balancing is fact-specific)
- Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517 (distinguishing established procedures from random acts for due process analysis)
- Rivera-Powell v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, 470 F.3d 458 (discussing categories of due-process claims)
- Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877 (noting when established procedures govern due-process analysis)
- Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1 (agency’s failure to follow internal rules does not by itself create federal due-process claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (conclusory allegations insufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6))
- Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674 (elements and motive requirement for class-of-one equal protection claims)
- Harlan Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494 (standard for selective treatment and rational-basis inquiry)
- Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (standard for determining good-faith appeal under § 1915)
