976 F.3d 986
9th Cir.2020Background
- Sonny Lam, a mentally ill, medication-noncompliant adult living with his father Tan, became agitated; Tan called police. Officer Jairo Acosta entered Sonny’s home and encountered Sonny in his bedroom.
- A physical struggle ensued; Sonny grabbed scissors and stabbed Acosta in the forearm. Acosta fired once, hitting Sonny in the leg, then retreated down a 16-foot hallway and cleared a jammed handgun.
- While Acosta was retreating, he fired a second shot that struck Sonny in the chest; Sonny later died. No contemporaneous warning was given before the second shot.
- A jury found (inter alia) that Sonny stabbed Acosta with scissors before the first shot, that Acosta retreated after the first shot, and that Sonny did not approach Acosta with scissors before the second shot. Tan Lam recovered on federal (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) and state negligence claims; Acosta appealed.
- Trial evidence included testimony about Acosta’s 2011 VA PTSD diagnosis; Acosta’s in limine motion was denied without prejudice and he did not renew the objection at trial.
- The Ninth Circuit: affirmed judgment for Lam on the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and state claims (and denial of qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment), reversed the Fourteenth Amendment due-process verdict (insufficient evidence of a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law‑enforcement objectives), and affirmed admission of PTSD evidence (no plain error).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence on jury finding that Sonny did not approach with scissors before 2nd shot | Lam: testimony and other evidence support that Sonny lacked scissors when the second shot was fired | Acosta: record compels contrary conclusion; jury finding unsupported | Court: Evidence (eyewitnesses, inconsistencies in Acosta’s accounts, trajectory evidence) supports the verdict; Rule 50(b) denial affirmed |
| Fourth Amendment excessive force (objective reasonableness) | Lam: second, fatal shot was unreasonable because Sonny was wounded/not an immediate threat and Acosta had alternatives | Acosta: shooting was reasonable given prior stabbing, confined space, rapid developments, and perceived ongoing threat | Court: Given jury findings (retreat; no scissors on approach), the second shot was objectively unreasonable; Fourth Amendment violation affirmed |
| Qualified immunity as to Fourth Amendment | Lam: law clearly established that shooting a nonthreatening, incapacitated person is unlawful | Acosta: no controlling precedent put a reasonable officer on notice in circumstances where he was just stabbed, jammed his gun, in a confined space, and the suspect advanced | Court: Under governing precedent (Hopkins, Deorle, Zion, Garner), law was clearly established that firing on a person who no longer posed an immediate threat violated rights; qualified immunity denied |
| Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process (loss of familial relationship — "shocks the conscience") | Lam: conduct was conscience‑shocking and amounted to purposeful harm; supports §1983 loss‑of‑familial‑relationship claim | Acosta: no evidence he acted with a malicious or illegitimate purpose unrelated to law‑enforcement objectives | Held: Reversed — record lacks substantial evidence that Acosta acted with purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate objectives; Fourteenth Amendment verdict vacated |
| Admission of 2011 PTSD evidence | Lam: PTSD evidence was relevant to Acosta’s perception, credibility, and likely to explain overreaction | Acosta: diagnosis was remote, irrelevant to 2013 conduct, unduly prejudicial and improper character evidence | Court: Acosta waived contemporaneous objection; evidence could bear on credibility/perception and admission was not plain error; ruling affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force cannot be used to seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect)
- Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1992) (initial justified shot does not necessarily justify later shots once suspect is wounded/unarmed)
- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (possession of a weapon earlier in encounter does not per se justify deadly force when suspect no longer poses an objective threat)
- Zion v. County of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2017) (repeated volleys may be unlawful if suspect ceased to pose an immediate threat; informs clearly‑established‑law analysis)
- Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2010) (framework for objective‑reasonableness in excessive‑force claims)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (two‑step qualified immunity inquiry)
- Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011) (multi‑factor balancing for excessive force: intrusion, government interest, and balance)
- Estate of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2017) (qualified immunity burden and analysis post‑trial)