Tamra Robinson v. First State Community Action A, 920 F.3d 182

Background

Tamra Robinson worked for First State Community Action Agency; her supervisor told her she either lacked skills, had a disability, or was dyslexic.
Robinson sought testing; a psychologist’s screening reported "signs of dyslexia" (not a formal diagnosis); she requested workplace accommodations and was told HR believed the screening did not affect her ability to perform the job.
Robinson was placed on a performance-development plan and was later terminated; she sued under the ADA alleging denial of reasonable accommodation and wrongful termination.
Robinson proceeded at summary judgment and trial primarily on a "regarded as" disability theory (arguing the employer regarded her as dyslexic), and the district court instructed the jury accordingly; the jury found for Robinson on the accommodation claim.
First State raised several post-trial challenges on appeal: (1) that the jury instruction permitting relief on a "regarded as" theory was erroneous after the ADA Amendments Act of 2008; (2) that the district court erroneously told the jury a $50,000 statutory damages cap; and (3) that plaintiff’s stricken testimony about an EEOC finding prejudiced the jury.
The Third Circuit affirmed: it held First State waived the 2008‑Amendments argument by acquiescing to the trial theory and instruction, rejected plain‑error reversal of the damages‑cap instruction as harmless, and found no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial over the stricken EEOC testimony.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a plaintiff who is only "regarded as" disabled is entitled to reasonable accommodation after the ADA Amendments Act of 2008	Robinson contended she needed only to show First State regarded her as disabled to recover for failure to accommodate	First State argued the ADAAA eliminated accommodation claims by "regarded as" plaintiffs, so the jury instruction was legally erroneous	Waived: First State repeatedly accepted and proposed the instruction and theory below, so it cannot raise the argument on appeal
Whether the district court’s instruction disclosing a $50,000 statutory damages cap requires reversal	Robinson did not argue the charge prejudiced the verdict	First State argued the instruction violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) and warranted a new trial	Plain error review; error found but harmless because jury award ($22,501) was well below the cap and no evidence the instruction affected the verdict
Whether Robinson’s testimony that the EEOC ruled in her favor required a new trial	Robinson maintained the testimony was promptly struck and cured by instruction	First State argued the statement was prejudicial and likely influenced the jury	No abuse of discretion: testimony was stricken, jury given curative instruction, and split verdict plus presumption jurors follow instructions counseled against a new trial
Whether use of Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions shields the court from error claims	Robinson suggested model instruction meant no plain error could exist	First State relied on model instruction to support the charge	The court explained model instructions are non‑binding aids; their presence does not preclude review for error, but here First State waived the objection

Key Cases Cited

Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004) (previous Third Circuit rule that a "regarded as" plaintiff could seek reasonable accommodations)
Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing when repeated acquiescence to an instruction does not amount to waiver)
United States v. Wasserson, 418 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2005) (failure to raise an objection at trial and on appeal can constitute waiver)
United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2010) (use of model jury instructions generally makes instructional error unlikely but does not render them law)
Collins v. Alco Parking Corp., 448 F.3d 652 (3d Cir. 2006) (Rule 51 requires a specific contemporaneous objection to preserve jury‑instruction error)
Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996) (erroneous disclosure of statutory damages cap can be prejudicial when the jury’s award suggests influence)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (U.S. 1987) (presumption that jurors follow curative instructions and standard for overcoming that presumption)