72 So. 3d 323
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2011Background
- Nancy Bachor, as personal representative of Kathleen Truxell, sued Emeritus for negligence and Florida Chapter 429 violations after Truxell stayed at an Emeritus facility.
- Bachor signed a two-page arbitration agreement as part of an admissions packet for her mother’s facility stay.
- The arbitration agreement stated disputes related to the admission agreement or services would be resolved by binding arbitration under Florida law, with judicial review only as provided by law.
- The agreement contained no typical arbitration limitations (damages, discovery, appellate rights) and stated damages would be determined under applicable law for a civil action.
- Bachor testified she believed she needed to sign all documents to admit her mother, but there was no showing she was told arbitration was mandatory or that she was coerced.
- The trial court denied arbitration, finding Bachor did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to a jury; the appellate court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable | Bachor lacked meaningful choice; forced to sign under time pressure and worry of admission | There was a meaningful opportunity to review, and the agreement disclosed rights and revocation; not a take-it-or-leave-it contract | Not procedurally unconscionable |
| Whether Bachor knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to a jury | Signing under pressure and lack of understanding of optional nature undermines waiver | There was a clear waiver language and revocation period; informed consent and no coercion | Waiver not proven procedurally unconscionable; reviewed de novo |
| Whether the trial court properly construed the arbitration clause | Arbitration should apply broadly to claims arising from admission and care | Arbitration language is broad but canalizes disputes to arbitration under Florida law | Court erred in construction; reversal and remand |
| Whether any remaining unconscionability analysis is necessary | Procedural unconscionability should be found given circumstances | Because procedural unconscionability is not established, no need to reach substantive unconscionability | Not necessary to address substantive unconscionability |
Key Cases Cited
- Bland ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 927 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (procedural unconscionability requires meaningful choice; high-level factors)
- Weston v. Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc., 857 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (arbitration not procedurally unconscionable where there was meaningful choice)
- Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Petsch, 872 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (evaluate contract terms, including take-it-or-leave-it dynamics)
- Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 748 So.2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (take-it-or-leave-it considerations in unconscionability analysis)
- Estate of Etting ex rel. Etting v. Regents Park at Aventura, Inc., 891 So.2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (review of whether signing party fully understood arbitration rights)
- Woebse v Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 977 So.2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (standard of review for factual findings in arbitration motions)
- Raymond James Financial Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So.2d 707 (Fla. 2005) (general favorability toward arbitration; contract defenses apply)