Tafoya v. Morrison
2017 NMCA 25
| N.M. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 1993 Alex J. Armijo (the father) split his parcel into Lot 1 (rear, retained) and Lot 2 (front, conveyed to Cecilia). The recorded plat reserved a 20-foot private ingress/egress easement to benefit Lot 1 running across Lot 2.
- Cecilia built her house on Lot 2; portions of the house, a stucco wall, and a chain-link fence encroached into the easement area. The estate (through Anthony Armijo, personal representative) sought to resolve access/encroachment issues and ultimately sold Lot 1 to the Morrisons in 2001.
- Armijo filed a quiet title action and later moved to revoke Cecilia’s inheritance under the will’s no-contest clause. During the revocation proceeding Cecilia asserted easement rights (express, implied, necessity) and agreed at times that the court could decide those issues.
- The district court in the revocation proceeding found Cecilia had no off-street parking easement or easement over Lot 1 and entered judgment revoking her inheritance; that revocation was reversed on appeal in Redman‑Tafoya on no‑contest clause grounds, but Cecilia did not appeal the trial court’s factual findings concerning the easement.
- The parties later executed a broad settlement and mutual release dismissing claims from the prior litigation (the Morrisons were not parties to that settlement). In 2011 the Tafoyas sued the Morrisons for quiet title and declaratory/injunctive relief asserting express, implied, necessity, and prescriptive easement theories; the Morrisons moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the Tafoyas’ express, implied, and necessity easement claims with prejudice as barred by res judicata (based on the revocation proceeding) and granted summary judgment against the prescriptive claim on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res judicata bars express and implied easement claims | Tafoya: prior revocation proceeding didn’t preclude this suit because Morrisons weren’t parties/privity and the later suit asserts different causes of action | Morrison: estate and Morrison were in privity (identity of interest); easement claims arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and were litigated or could have been litigated earlier | Held: Res judicata applies; claims were part of same transaction and parties were in privity via substantially identical interests |
| Whether privity existed between the estate (prior defendant) and the Morrisons (current defendants) | Tafoya: no privity—estate was an indemnitor/grantor and could not bind a nonparty grantee; no express consent by Morrisons | Morrison: privity satisfied because both had aligned, substantial identity of interest (estate warranted title; Morrisons wanted title free of encumbrance) | Held: Privity exists under a pragmatic, case‑by‑case test—substantial identity of interests sufficed |
| Whether the Tafoyas had a full and fair opportunity to litigate easement issues earlier | Tafoya: they lacked a full and fair opportunity because the revocation proceeding centered on inheritance, Morrisons weren’t parties, and easement was a minor/untested subissue | Morrison: easement issues were litigated (discovery, motions, testimony); Cecilia agreed to have court decide easement matters | Held: Tafoyas had a full and fair opportunity; they presented evidence and argument in the revocation proceeding |
| Whether prescriptive easement claim survives (is it time‑barred or merits‑defeated) | Tafoya: prescriptive claim was not litigated earlier and thus not barred; start date for adverse use is a triable fact | Morrison: claim fails on the merits—Tafoyas used the driveway permissively and did not establish 10 years of adverse use; settlement/release argument asserted but undeveloped | Held: Summary judgment for Morrisons on prescriptive claim — Tafoyas failed to show uninterrupted adverse use for the required 10‑year period; settlement argument rejected for lack of developed legal support |
Key Cases Cited
- Potter v. Pierce, 342 P.3d 54 (N.M. 2015) (articulates transactional test and full and fair opportunity standard for res judicata)
- Kirby v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 231 P.3d 87 (N.M. 2010) (elements of claim preclusion/privity discussed)
- Deflon v. Sawyers, 137 P.3d 577 (N.M. 2006) (privity and successive interest analysis under res judicata)
- Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176 (N.M. 2003) (elements and nature of easement by prescription explained)
- Bloom v. Hendricks, 804 P.2d 1069 (N.M. 1991) (discussion of predecessor‑in‑title issues and related limits of nonparty preclusion)
- St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1979) (definition of privity requiring substantial identity of interests)