343 F. Supp. 3d 904
N.D. Cal.2018Background
- Plaintiffs are relatives of Nawras Alassaf, killed in the January 2017 Reina nightclub ISIS attack in Istanbul; they sued Twitter, Google (YouTube), and Facebook alleging the platforms aided ISIS.
- Plaintiffs alleged Defendants facilitated ISIS recruitment, fundraising, propaganda, planning, account reestablishment, targeted advertising, content recommendation, and revenue-sharing with ISIS content creators.
- Plaintiffs pleaded direct ATA claims (material support, concealment) and indirect JASTA claims (aiding/abetting and conspiracy), plus state wrongful death and negligent infliction claims.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) primarily arguing Plaintiffs failed to plead proximate causation and that JASTA requires a connection to a specific terrorist act.
- The court applied Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards and Ninth Circuit precedent in Fields, holding Plaintiffs did not plausibly plead a direct relationship between defendants’ conduct and the Reina attack or that defendants knowingly and substantially assisted that specific attack.
- The court dismissed all federal and state claims with prejudice and entered final judgment for defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs plausibly alleged proximate causation under §2333(a) for direct ATA liability | Defendants' platforms materially supported ISIS and "radicalized" the attacker, so their services were a proximate cause of the Reina attack | Plaintiffs fail to plead a direct relationship between platform services and the attacker or the specific attack; foreseeability alone is insufficient | Dismissed: Plaintiffs' conclusory claim of "radicalization" and lack of allegations that attacker viewed or used defendants' platforms fails Fields' direct-relationship proximate-cause requirement |
| Whether JASTA (§2333(d)(2)) aiding-and-abetting/conspiracy claims are adequately pleaded | JASTA permits secondary liability for aiding a foreign terrorist organization; defendants generally aided ISIS through their services | JASTA requires a connection to a specific act and plaintiffs do not allege defendants knowingly and substantially assisted the Reina attack or were generally aware they were playing a role in violent acts | Dismissed: plaintiffs did not allege the requisite "general awareness" or "substantial assistance" under Halberstam/Linde framework |
| Whether targeted advertising/recommendation features or ad revenue sharing create material support or substantial assistance | Plaintiffs: recommendation algorithms, ad-targeting, and alleged revenue-sharing with ISIS content converted platform infrastructure into material support | Defendants: these are routine, public-facing services and do not show a major, integral role in any particular terrorist act or intent to further terrorism | Dismissed: allegations describe routine services and speculation, insufficient to show substantial assistance or intent |
| Whether state-law wrongful death and negligent infliction claims survive | Plaintiffs: state proximate-cause standard is more lenient and could be met by alleged radicalization via platforms | Defendants: plaintiffs still fail to show proximate causation under state-law substantial-factor test | Dismissed with prejudice: conclusory radicalization allegation insufficient even under a more forgiving state standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires plausible factual allegations)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must cross line from conceivable to plausible)
- Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (ATA "by reason of" requires some direct relationship between defendant's acts and injury)
- Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2018) (JASTA aiding-and-abetting requires general awareness of playing a role in terrorist activities and substantial assistance)
- Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (civil aiding-and-abetting factors for substantial assistance)
- Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (proximate-cause "some direct relation" standard in RICO context)
- Pennie v. Twitter, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (conclusory allegations of radicalization via social media insufficient)
- Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 3d 564 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (dismissing ATA and JASTA claims for failure to plead proximate cause/substantial assistance)
- Owens v. BNP Paribas, 897 F.3d 266 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (discussing proximate-cause standards and substantial-factor approach in terrorism-related claims)