T.W. v. United States, 292 A.3d 790

Police in two marked cruisers (crime-suppression team) spotted T.W. near an apartment building; officers hurried into a narrow driveway/alley and stopped with cruisers on both sides. At least six officers were in the two cars, and multiple officers exited before a search occurred.
T.W., the only person in the area, raised his hands when officers exited their vehicle. Officers asked whether he had a gun; after T.W. twice said no, Officer Gendelman said, “I can pat you down just to make sure?” and T.W. replied “Yeah.”
Gendelman immediately began a pat-down and located a loaded handgun, magazine, and ammunition; encounter lasted roughly 10–15 seconds from officers exiting to discovery of the weapon.
At a suppression hearing the trial court denied T.W.’s motion to suppress, finding no seizure prior to consent; T.W. stipulated to a bench trial, was convicted of multiple weapons offenses, and was sentenced under the Youth Rehabilitation Act.
On appeal the government conceded that if T.W. was seized before consenting, suppression was required; the D.C. Court of Appeals (majority) concluded T.W. was seized, held the consent was tainted, and reversed his convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was T.W. "seized" under the Fourth Amendment before he consented to the pat-down?	T.W.: Yes — multiple marked cruisers boxed him in, several uniformed officers approached from both sides, accusatory repeated questioning showed disbelief, and a reasonable innocent person would not feel free to leave.	Gov.: No — encounter was very brief, conversational and cordial, officers did not display weapons or give commands, there was space/egress, so a reasonable person could have walked away.	Majority: Yes — totality (vehicles, multiple officers, pincer approach, accusatory questions despite denials) made a reasonable person feel not free to leave; seizure occurred before consent.
Is the gun admissible or suppressed as the fruit of the seizure?	T.W.: Suppress — consent was contemporaneous with an unlawful seizure and thus tainted.	Gov.: Concedes suppression required if seizure occurred; otherwise admissible.	Held: Suppress — consent tainted by unlawful seizure; convictions reversed.
Was consent voluntary and did the pat-down exceed its scope?	T.W.: Consent was involuntary (felt he could not refuse) and any subsequent shirt-lift exceeded pat-down scope.	Gov.: Consent voluntary; search was lawful scope.	Majority: Did not reach voluntariness/scope because seizure dispositive. Dissent: Would have found no seizure, voluntary consent, and affirmed convictions.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (pat-down/stop-and-frisk framework)
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (reasonable-person "free to leave" test)
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (totality-of-circumstances seizure inquiry)
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (examples of conduct indicating seizure)
Golden v. United States, 248 A.3d 925 (D.C. 2021) (seizure where officer’s request to expose waistband made encounter non-voluntary)
Dozier v. United States, 220 A.3d 933 (D.C. 2019) (seizure by time suspect complied with pat-down request)
Jones v. United States, 154 A.3d 591 (D.C. 2017) (factors bearing on whether a person is seized)
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (consent on bus; no seizure found)
Brown v. United States, 983 A.2d 1023 (D.C. 2009) (distinguished on coercion/show-of-force grounds)
Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d 1282 (D.C. 1990) (accusatory question alone does not necessarily create a seizure)