T.W. v. M.C.
363 P.3d 193
| Colo. | 2015Background
- J.Z. gave birth to twins, relinquished parental rights, and fraudulently concealed the father’s identity; adoptive parents T.W. and A.W. adopted the twins and received a final adoption decree.
- M.C. later learned he was the biological father, obtained genetic confirmation, and successfully moved to void the default termination of his parental rights based on the mother's fraud.
- The trial court reinstated M.C.’s rights, ordered limited visitation, and set a two-day bench trial to determine whether to terminate his restored parental rights under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-5-105(8.1).
- At trial the court found by clear and convincing evidence that M.C. had not "promptly taken substantial parental responsibility"—primarily because he made a single $250 child-support payment in the ~3 months after restoration—and that termination was in the children’s best interests given their strong attachment to the adoptive parents.
- The court of appeals reversed, finding the trial court failed to give the Troxel presumption "special weight," misapplied the statutory affirmative‑defense analysis, and should have considered all expenditures M.C. incurred; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: it held the trial court satisfied Troxel/Santosky protections and did not abuse discretion in relying on the single child‑support payment; termination of M.C.’s parental rights was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (M.C.) | Defendant's Argument (Adoptive parents/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Troxel presumption required special treatment in § 19‑5‑105 proceedings | Troxel requires "special weight" to a fit parent’s decisions and specific articulation of special factors; trial court failed to apply it | § 19‑5‑105 already contains a presumption and required findings; Troxel’s requirements were satisfied by the statutory scheme and trial court findings | Trial court satisfied Troxel/Santosky; court of appeals erred to the extent it found a due‑process violation |
| Whether § 19‑5‑105 provides adequate due‑process protections for parental‑rights termination | Statutory scheme must incorporate Troxel’s special‑factors and Santosky’s clear‑and‑convincing standard; trial court failed to do so | § 19‑5‑105 demands specific factual findings and clear‑and‑convincing proof, which meet Troxel/Santosky due‑process requirements | § 19‑5‑105, together with the presumption applied, adequately protects due process rights |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by considering only M.C.’s single $250 payment when finding failure to take "substantial responsibility" | Court should have counted all expenses (travel, gifts, litigation costs) and considered that adoptive parents impeded support/visitation; and should assess likelihood of future support | Statute requires support be "for the care of the child" and "according to the parent’s means"; many of M.C.’s expenditures were not regular child support and no impediment excused nonpayment | No abuse of discretion: the $250 was neither "regular" nor "reasonable"; travel/litigation/gift costs were not child support under the statute |
| Whether termination was in the children’s best interests given attachment to adoptive parents | M.C. is biological parent and wishes custody; removal could preserve parental bond and identity; court should weigh parental liberty heavily | Twins are securely attached to adoptive parents, removal would likely cause significant psychological harm; best interests paramount under § 19‑5‑105(8.2) | Clear and convincing evidence supported finding that termination and placement with adoptive parents served the children’s best interests |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (plurality) (parents have a presumption that they act in children's best interests; courts must give parental decisions special weight)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in child rearing; termination requires clear and convincing evidence)
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest)
- In re C.L.S., 252 P.3d 556 (Colo. App. 2011) (parental‑rights termination voidable where birth parent’s fraud prevented notice to father)
- People ex rel. A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982) (Colorado requires clear‑and‑convincing standard in termination proceedings)