T.M.S. VS. W.C.P. (FV-01-684-07, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
A-4900-15T2
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Jun 5, 2017Background
- Plaintiff obtained a TRO after an October 31, 2006 domestic violence incident; defendant admitted the act and an FRO was entered on November 29, 2006.
- Defendant moved under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(d) and Carfagno to vacate the FRO; first motion was denied (May 13, 2008), second Carfagno application was granted after plaintiff did not appear and the court found she had been properly served.
- With the FRO vacated, defendant sought return of forfeited weapons; at the weapons-forfeiture proceeding, plaintiff (through counsel) later claimed she had not been served with the Carfagno dismissal order.
- The judge presiding over the weapons matter sua sponte vacated the dismissal order and reinstated the FRO, then ordered a new Carfagno hearing before a different judge.
- The subsequent Carfagno hearing denied defendant’s request to vacate the reinstated FRO; motions for reconsideration were denied and defendant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court may reinstate an FRO sua sponte in an ancillary proceeding | Plaintiff argued the court could correct an erroneous dismissal to protect the victim (implicit) | Reinstatement must be by motion in the underlying DV matter (Rule 4:50-1); court lacks jurisdiction to sua sponte revive a final dismissal | Trial court abused its discretion; sua sponte reinstatement was improper—applications to reopen must be filed in the underlying DV matter by formal motion |
| Proper application of Carfagno factors in deciding to dissolve FRO | Plaintiff opposed dissolution and did not appear; argued service defect justified reinstatement | Defendant argued Carfagno factors favored dismissal (sobriety, counseling, lack of contact, no other orders) | Court did not reach merits of second judge’s Carfagno analysis because initial reinstatement was vacated; trial court should have required formal motion and afforded defendant due process |
| Whether one judge must handle DV matters from start to finish | Plaintiff implicitly favored continuity for victim protection | Defendant claimed prejudice from having two different judges hear related matters | One-judge-one-case is a recommendation, not a mandate; statute requires same judge or a complete record—here no showing the second judge lacked the record, so multiple judges are permissible |
| Double jeopardy bar to multiple Carfagno reviews | Plaintiff’s position not asserted | Defendant argued repeated Carfagno reviews violated double jeopardy | Double jeopardy inapplicable—the PDVA proceeding is civil, distinct from criminal prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (discusses standard of review and deference to trial court fact findings) (N.J. 1998)
- Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424 (establishes eleven-factor test for vacating an FRO) (Ch. Div. 1995)
- T.M. v. J.C., 348 N.J. Super. 101 (discusses jurisdictional effect of dismissal of domestic violence complaints) (App. Div.)
- J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458 (due process limits on converting allegations and notice requirements in DV proceedings) (N.J. 2011)
- State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475 (explains double jeopardy protections and scope) (N.J. 1999)
- Kanaszka v. Kunen, 313 N.J. Super. 600 (endorses factor-analysis approach of Carfagno) (App. Div.)
