340 P.3d 1277
N.M. Ct. App.2014Background
- In 1928 the Wilsons (including Mabel G. Wilson) sold 160 acres in San Juan County but reserved the oil and gas in the deed to David Miller; the deed was recorded in San Juan County.
- Thomas Miller (David’s brother) acquired title; in 1948 Thomas Miller filed a quiet-title action in San Juan County. Service on the Wilsons was by publication only in a Farmington paper; the sheriff’s return indicated he could not find the defendants in San Juan County.
- The 1948 decree quieted title in Miller; later conveyances and mineral leases flowed from that title and remained recorded. The Wilsons (and heirs) took no action regarding the reservation until 2002–2010 when mineral development made the reservation valuable.
- Plaintiffs (the Wilson heirs and a lessee) sued in 2010 to quiet title to the reserved oil and gas and to invalidate the 1948 adjudication as to the Wilsons, arguing that service by publication in Farmington without attempts to locate and personally serve the Wilsons in San Diego violated due process.
- The district court adopted the special master’s recommendation and granted summary judgment for Defendants, invoking due-process sufficiency, collateral-attack limitations, and equitable defenses (laches, waiver, judicial estoppel). The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of 1948 notice / due process (service by publication) | Miller knew or could with reasonable diligence have located Mabel Weeber in San Diego (Pershing Ave.) and thus must have made good-faith efforts for personal service or out-of-county publication; publication in Farmington alone was inadequate | Publication and the sheriff’s return were sufficient; Miller averred diligent search and the court found jurisdiction | Court held Miller failed to exercise reasonable diligence/good faith to notify the Wilsons; publication only in Farmington was constitutionally inadequate and the 1948 judgment was void as to the Wilsons |
| Collateral attack on 1948 judgment | The 1948 judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction because service was inadequate; thus a collateral attack is permissible | A collateral attack is improper unless the 1948 record affirmatively shows lack of jurisdiction; the judgment on its face indicates jurisdiction | Court held collateral attack was permissible because the 1948 record shows Miller avoided apprising the court of the Wilsons’ out-of-state residence and did not make required efforts to notify them |
| Equitable defenses: laches, waiver, judicial estoppel | Plaintiffs had no notice of the 1948 proceeding or later recorded transactions and therefore did not delay with knowledge; equitable defenses do not bar their claim | The recordation of the 1948 judgment and subsequent recorded conveyances gave constructive notice and plaintiffs delayed unreasonably after mineral development | Court held laches, waiver, and judicial estoppel were not supported: record did not show plaintiffs had notice or acquiesced, so equitable bars were inappropriate |
| Presumed-grant doctrine (Defendants’ alternative) | — | Defendants urged presumed grant as alternative basis to affirm | Court declined to address because trial court/special master did not rule on it; issue not preserved for appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (publication notice is constitutionally adequate only when parties are unknown or cannot be located and notice must be reasonably calculated to inform interested parties)
- Campbell v. Doherty, 53 N.M. 280 (N.M. 1949) (plaintiff must exercise diligence and good faith to discover defendants’ names/locations before resorting to constructive service)
- Owens v. Owens, 32 N.M. 445 (N.M. 1927) (constructive service is a harsh remedy; diligence required and one may not remain deliberately ignorant of a defendant’s whereabouts)
- Bowers v. Brazell, 31 N.M. 316 (N.M. 1926) (when a defendant resides outside the state, plaintiff must allege that fact and diligence before service by publication is allowed)
- Skaggs v. Conoco, Inc., 125 N.M. 97 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (laches may bar relief where complainant had timely notice of the challenged transaction and defendants substantially relied and invested)
- Farrar v. Hood, 56 N.M. 724 (N.M. 1952) (laches barred a late challenge to a transaction where plaintiff delayed many years while value materially increased and defendants relied)