Sykes v. United States
564 U.S. 1
SCOTUS2011Background
- Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in connection with an attempted robbery at gunpoint and had three prior felonies.
- Two of the prior felonies were robberies; the third was Indiana’s vehicle flight offense, Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3, for fleeing from a law enforcement officer.
- Indiana § 35-44-3-3(a)(3) makes fleeing from an officer a misdemeanor, but § 3(b)(1)(A) elevates it to a class D felony if a vehicle is used; § 3(b)(1)(B) adds a ‘substantial risk’ element.
- Sykes’s flight offense involved driving with flight conduct (e.g., not stopping, driving recklessly, damaging property) and fleeing through yards and bystanders, followed by foot pursuit.
- District Court sentenced Sykes under ACCA’s violent-felony enhancement to 188 months; Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the case then reached the Supreme Court due to conflict among circuits.
- The Court held that Indiana’s vehicular flight offense § 3(b)(1)(A) is a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause as applied to the ordinary case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Indiana’s vehicle flight under § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA | Sykes contends § 3(b)(1)(A) lacks inherent risk; argues no ACCA predicate. | The government argues § 3(b)(1)(A) inherently poses serious risk in the ordinary case. | Yes; vehicle flight ordinarily involves serious risk of physical injury. |
| Whether Begay or James control the residual-clause test for this offense | Begay’s purposeful, violent, and aggressive test should apply to strict-liability and non-violent crimes. | Court should use risk-based approach consistent with James and Begay to determine residual-clause applicability. | The residual clause is satisfied by risk-based analysis; the ordinary Indiana vehicle flight is violent. |
| Does Indiana’s statutory structure (b)(1)(A) vs (b)(1)(B)) affect ACCA analysis | Indiana treated both forms as same magnitude; the Court should treat them similarly under ACCA. | Statutory structure shows § 3(b)(1)(A) covers simple flight and § 3(b)(1)(B) covers aggravated flight; this distinction matters for ACCA. | Yes; ordinary form (A) is still within ACCA’s residual clause as inherently risky. |
| Whether § 3(b)(1)(A) is a lesser included offense of § 3(b)(1)(B) for ACCA purposes | If subsumed, both counts may count or not count under ACCA depending on inclusion. | Subsection (A) and (B) are not merely same offense; they represent escalating conduct. | Not dispositive, but analysis supports treating (A) as within residual-clause risk. |
Key Cases Cited
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (categorical approach to violent felonies under ACCA)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (purposeful, violent, and aggressive test for ACCA residual clause)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (statistical evidence can inform risk assessment under ACCA)