Swift v. State
540 S.W.3d 288
| Ark. | 2018Background
- In 2013 Swift pleaded guilty (or nolo contendere) to first-degree battery (Class B) and first-degree criminal mischief (Class D) and was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate 300 months' imprisonment.
- In November 2016 Swift filed a pro se petition under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 to correct an illegal sentence, later amending it.
- Swift argued his sentence was illegal because (1) he did not knowingly/intelligently sign the habitual-offender plea (the “habitual offender” designation on the plea form was circled, not checked), (2) his trial counsel misinformed him about parole eligibility and the sentence, and (3) ADC incorrectly determined he must serve 100% (no parole) on the battery count.
- The trial court dismissed the petition, finding the sentences were not illegal on their face and that Rule 37.1 claims were untimely and successive.
- Swift appealed; the appellate court reviewed whether the sentences were void on their face and therefore reviewable at any time under § 16-90-111.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea was invalid because the plea form circled “habitual offender” instead of checking the box | Swift: the circled designation shows he was not properly informed or did not knowingly consent to habitual-offender treatment | State: the signed and initialed plea agreement and sentence were within lawful ranges; a circled designation does not render the judgment facially invalid | Held: No — form peculiarity did not make the sentence illegal on its face; Swift had signed and initialed the agreement |
| Whether ineffective assistance / counsel’s misadvice about parole makes the sentence illegal | Swift: counsel told him he would be eligible for parole after ~5 years; he would not have pleaded if properly advised | State: counsel’s alleged advice and ineffective-assistance claims do not render the judgment void on its face and are matters for Rule 37.1 | Held: No — counsel’s advice/ineffectiveness does not make the sentence facially illegal under § 16-90-111 |
| Whether ADC’s determination that Swift must serve 100% (no parole) renders the original judgment illegal | Swift: ADC’s parole decision shows he misunderstood parole eligibility when pleading | State: ADC parole determinations do not invalidate the original judgment; not a § 16-90-111 ground | Held: No — ADC’s parole determination is not a basis to vacate the sentence under § 16-90-111 |
| Whether other claims (ineffective assistance, sentencing errors) are barred as untimely/successive under Rule 37.1 | Swift: raised various collateral claims in petition/amended petition | State: those claims should have been brought timely under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37; prior Rule 37 relief had been denied | Held: Court agreed they were untimely/successive to the extent they were Rule 37 claims; not cognizable under § 16-90-111 because sentences are not illegal on their face |
Key Cases Cited
- Fischer v. State, 532 S.W.3d 40 (Ark. 2017) (defines illegal sentence as one that is illegal on its face and void beyond the court's authority)
- Green v. State, 502 S.W.3d 524 (Ark. 2016) (facial invalidity where judgment lacked required habitual-offender checkmark on judgment itself)
- Lambert v. State, 692 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1985) (sentence illegal on its face when void and implicates subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Jenkins v. State, 529 S.W.3d 236 (Ark. 2017) (§ 16-90-111 remains available to challenge facially illegal sentences)
- Ashby v. State, 761 S.W.2d 912 (Ark. 1988) (guilty and nolo contendere pleas treated equivalently for plea acceptance inquiry)