2019 Ohio 4605
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Plaintiff Lyle Sweeney filed a small-claims action claiming personal property was stolen while he was in Delaware County Jail custody and being transferred to a hospital.
- Defendant Shelley Pfan, identified as the jail director, moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing she was an employee of a political subdivision entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A) and that she was not the proximate cause of the loss.
- Pfan’s motion attached factual assertions (e.g., deputy returned property, hospital video) that were not in the small-claims complaint.
- The magistrate denied dismissal; Pfan objected, arguing she was sued in her official capacity and therefore immune.
- The trial court overruled the objections, holding the complaint did not allege Pfan is a county employee, so the court could not consider facts outside the complaint on a 12(B)(6) motion; it noted Pfan could reassert immunity at the close of evidence.
- Pfan appealed; the Fifth District affirmed, finding the complaint insufficient on its face to invoke political-subdivision immunity and any conversion to summary judgment (if it occurred) was harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pfan is entitled to political-subdivision employee immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A) | Sweeney alleged loss of property while in jail custody; complaint sufficiently names Pfan | Pfan contends she was sued in her official capacity as the jail administrator and thus immune | Court: On a 12(B)(6) motion, accept complaint allegations only; complaint does not allege Pfan is a county employee—immunity not established; dismissal denied |
| Whether the trial court erred by converting the motion to dismiss into a summary-judgment motion without giving notice | Sweeney: no improper conversion requiring reversal | Pfan: conversion without notice is reversible; she should be allowed to submit evidence of immunity | Court: If conversion occurred, error was harmless because Pfan, the moving party, supplied extraneous materials and may reassert immunity at trial’s close; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228 (Ohio 1990) (announces de novo standard of review for Civ.R. 12(B)(6))
- Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56 (Ohio 1991) (on a motion to dismiss, court must accept complaint allegations and draw reasonable inferences for nonmoving party)
- O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (Ohio 1975) (motion to dismiss standard: plaintiff must show some set of facts entitling relief)
- State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio St.3d 206 (Ohio 1997) (court may not rely on materials outside the complaint when deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion)
- State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324 (Ohio 2006) (courts may consider legal memoranda on legal issues but not factual allegations outside the complaint)
- Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192 (Ohio 2003) (when evidence outside pleadings is presented, court must either disregard it or convert to summary judgment)
- State ex rel. The V. Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467 (Ohio 1998) (if court converts to summary judgment, it must notify parties and allow reasonable opportunity to present Civ.R. 56 materials)
- Petrey v. Simon, 4 Ohio St.3d 154 (Ohio 1983) (unexpected conversion to summary judgment can unfairly deny opportunity for discovery and response)