Swanson v. Swanson
2019 ND 25
N.D.2019Background
- Roy and Gaye Swanson married in 1969, separated in 2006; Roy filed for divorce in 2016 and the district court granted divorce after a three‑day trial.
- The district court applied the Ruff–Fischer guidelines and found neither party’s fault warranted altering property division.
- The court divided the marital estate: Roy received about 65% (including inherited farmland, the seed business, and ~$1.8 million in farm debt); Gaye received about 35% (personal and farm assets, a life insurance policy on Roy, and ~$11,000 debt), plus a $1,000/month spousal award for five years.
- Disputed items included parcels allegedly transferred to Gaye’s sons (some transfers made during the divorce), and a 2007 Hummer valued at $10,000 that Gaye claimed was owned by her son.
- Gaye argued the division was inequitable, the court should have found Roy at fault (economic waste) based on his criminal conviction and lost foster license, and that some assets were not hers to include in the marital estate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gaye) | Defendant's Argument (Roy) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the property division was equitable / whether substantial disparity needed explanation | Division (35% to Gaye) was inequitable given long marriage and contributions | District court justified disparity by assigning farm debt to Roy and preserving farm viability | Affirmed — no clear error; court explained rationale and preserved farm operation |
| Whether specific property transfers and the Hummer were separate (exclude from marital estate) | Transfers to sons and Hummer were not marital assets (owned by sons) | Deeds and disclosures showed Gaye retained ownership or intent to control; some transfers during litigation were attempts to divest | Affirmed — court reasonably included disputed parcels and $10,000 Hummer interest in marital estate |
| Whether inherited farmland must be treated as separate property and excluded | Inheritance from Roy’s mother should not have been fully awarded to Roy | Court considered origin but awarded farmland to Roy because Gaye could not service debt and to preserve the farm business | Affirmed — court permissibly considered origin and business viability; assigned farmland and debt to Roy |
| Whether Roy’s criminal conviction/domestic violence order constituted economic fault/dissipation | Roy’s conviction led to economic harm (loss of foster license) and domestic violence order shows fault—should alter distribution | Court considered conduct but found insufficient evidence of economic waste or dissipation tied to conviction/order | Affirmed — refusal to treat conviction as dispositive economic fault was not clearly erroneous; court’s factual choices upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Berg v. Berg, 2018 ND 79, 908 N.W.2d 705 (district court findings on property distribution not overturned unless clearly erroneous)
- Brew v. Brew, 2017 ND 242, 903 N.W.2d 72 (no set formula for division; consider property origin under Ruff–Fischer)
- Hitz v. Hitz, 2008 ND 58, 746 N.W.2d 732 (separate property initially included; valuations within evidence range not clearly erroneous)
- Rebel v. Rebel, 2016 ND 144, 882 N.W.2d 256 (consider Ruff–Fischer factors; preserve ongoing business operations)
- Hoverson v. Hoverson, 2001 ND 124, 629 N.W.2d 573 (economic fault/dissipation defined; trial court best for credibility and valuation)
- Amsbaugh v. Amsbaugh, 2004 ND 11, 673 N.W.2d 601 (destruction/squandering of assets is proper Ruff–Fischer consideration)
- Conzemius v. Conzemius, 2014 ND 5, 841 N.W.2d 716 (fault findings are factual and reviewed for clear error)
- Parisien v. Parisien, 2010 ND 35, 779 N.W.2d 130 (incarceration’s effect on spousal support discussed; not dispositive here)