Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153

On Aug. 19, 2016, Sean Swanson arranged to sell marijuana; Noel Reed arrived at the meeting and produced a TEC-9 handgun. Swanson, seated in his car, retrieved a Sig Sauer and shot Reed, who died. Swanson and a passenger then left; police later arrested Swanson and recovered drugs and firearms.
Swanson was indicted for sale of marijuana and felony murder (predicated on the sale). He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life for felony murder; the drug count was merged for sentencing.
At trial, a State witness (Tia Coleman, granted testimonial immunity) and Swanson both testified that Reed brandished a gun, grabbed the marijuana, threatened "run it, I need everything or I’m going to shoot someone," and kept the gun pointed at the car occupants before Swanson fired.
Trial counsel requested and the court charged self-defense (OCGA § 16-3-21), but counsel did not request a charge on defense of habitation (OCGA § 16-3-23). Self-defense is statutorily unavailable if the defendant is committing a felony; defense of habitation lacks that exclusion.
Post-trial, Swanson moved for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance for failure to request the habitation charge and for withdrawing a voluntary manslaughter charge. The trial court denied relief; on appeal the Georgia Supreme Court considered the ineffective-assistance claim regarding defense of habitation and reversed the felony-murder conviction, ordering a new trial.

Issue	Swanson's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury charge on defense of habitation (OCGA § 16-3-23)	Counsel’s failure was objectively unreasonable because there was at least slight evidence Swanson remained in his car while Reed threatened/attempted further entry or to commit a felony in the vehicle; defense of habitation was available and not barred by Swanson’s involvement in the drug sale.	The evidence showed Reed had already taken the marijuana and stepped away when shot, so no ongoing entry/attack supported habitation; jury already rejected self-defense, so a habitation charge would not have changed the outcome.	Trial counsel was deficient for not requesting the habitation charge and Swanson was prejudiced — reasonable probability of a different outcome; conviction reversed and new trial ordered.
Whether counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a request to charge voluntary manslaughter	Swanson argued counsel’s withdrawal was another instance of deficient representation.	State did not contest on appeal; court deemed the issue unnecessary to decide because felony-murder conviction was reversed.	Not reached (moot) because conviction reversed.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339 (addresses objective-reasonableness inquiry under Strickland in Georgia)
Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291 (defense-of-habitation jury charge authorized where defendant fired from vehicle at an outside aggressor; counsel deficient for failing to request it)
Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516 (counsel deficient for failing to request defense-of-habitation charge where evidence supported that victim unlawfully entered vehicle and threatened occupants)
Kendrick v. State, 287 Ga. 676 (emphasizes examining the precise moment defendant used deadly force to assess whether habitation defense applies)