128 So. 3d 915
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2013Background
- On Oct. 19, 2008 Aaron Swanson struck and killed City of Tampa employee Miguel Mercado; Mercado’s estate sued for wrongful death seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
- Swanson admitted negligence, conceded sole proximate cause, and expressly conceded gross negligence and entitlement to punitive damages before trial.
- The trial court initially ordered a two-phase trial (liability/compensatory & punitive liability first; punitive amount second) but denied motions in limine to exclude evidence of Swanson’s drug use from phase one.
- Plaintiff introduced extensive evidence in the compensatory phase of Swanson’s recent drug/alcohol use, sleep deprivation, and history of addiction; experts disputed whether impairment could be established.
- Jury awarded substantial compensatory damages (including $4,250,000 for pain and suffering) and $1,500,000 punitive damages; jury found Swanson impaired.
- Swanson appealed, arguing admission of drug-use evidence in the compensatory phase was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial given his concessions; appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial on compensatory damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of defendant’s drug/alcohol use in compensatory phase | Evidence of drug use is relevant to Mrs. Mercado’s pain and suffering because knowledge of misconduct increased her mental anguish | Irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial once liability (including punitive liability) is conceded; only damages amount remains | Reversed: drug-use evidence should not have been admitted in compensatory phase where defendant unequivocally conceded liability and punitive entitlement |
| Whether bifurcation under W.R. Grace requires admitting punitive-liability evidence in phase one | W.R. Grace permits hearing punitive-liability evidence at phase one of a bifurcated trial | Where defendant concedes punitive liability, W.R. Grace does not justify admitting punitive-liability evidence that would inflame jury on compensatory damages | Court: W.R. Grace does not require admission when the defendant has unequivocally stipulated to liability; conflict with Dessanti certified |
| Relevance of impairment evidence to punitive cap (statutory exception) | Impairment evidence matters to whether punitive-damages cap applies, so proof of impairment is relevant to punitive amount | Issue of impairment affects amount only and belongs in punitive-amount phase | Court: impairment is relevant in second phase (punitive amount) but not in compensatory phase |
| Prejudice vs. probative value under §90.403 | Probative of mental anguish/pain and suffering | Probative value substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice and juror inflamation | Court: prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value in compensatory phase; admission was reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Michael v. State, 884 So.2d 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (standard that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Shaw v. Jain, 914 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (drug-use evidence not relevant to injury causation and should be excluded)
- Neering v. Johnson, 390 So.2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (when defendant admits liability, sobriety evidence should not be admitted on damages-only issue)
- Metropolitan Dade County v. Cox, 453 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (if liability is conceded, evidence regarding liability is irrelevant and prejudicial to damages determination)
- W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 638 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1994) (bifurcation framework: first stage hears liability for compensatory and punitive damages; second stage determines punitive amount)
- Dessanti v. Contreras, 695 So.2d 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (refused to compel bifurcation to shield jury from punitive-liability evidence; court here certifies conflict)