Swanson v. Consumer Direct
2017 MT 57
| Mont. | 2017Background
- Maria Atkins‑Swanson participated in Montana’s Self‑Directed Personal Assistance Services Program (PASP); she selected, trained, supervised, and re‑certified her personal assistant, Taylor Lang.
- Consumer Direct was a licensed provider that acted as employer of record only for administrative tasks (payroll, taxes, background checks) and provided administrative support under the Self‑Directed PASP.
- In 2013 Atkins‑Swanson died from a drug overdose while Lang was serving as her personal assistant; Lee Swanson (personal representative) sued Consumer Direct for wrongful death, survivorship, and breach of contract, alleging respondeat superior and negligence.
- Consumer Direct moved for summary judgment relying on § 53‑6‑145(5), MCA, which states medical and related liability for personal‑care services rests with the person directing the services.
- The District Court granted summary judgment to Consumer Direct and denied Swanson’s Rule 59(e) motion; the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the statute and implementing regulations place day‑to‑day direction and related liability on the Consumer in a Self‑Directed PASP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Consumer Direct can be liable under respondeat superior for Lang’s actions | Swanson: Consumer Direct is the common‑law employer of Lang and thus vicariously liable | Consumer Direct: Under § 53‑6‑145 and PASP rules Consumer Direct is only administrative employer; the Consumer directs services and bears liability | Held for Consumer Direct — statute and regulations make the Consumer the person directing services, so liability rests with the Consumer |
| Whether § 53‑6‑145(5) is ambiguous or allows shared liability | Swanson: Statute is ambiguous; could be read to limit standard of care or allow shared liability | Consumer Direct: Plain language and regulations assign medical and related liability to the person directing services (the Consumer) | Held for Consumer Direct — plain meaning and legislative history assign liability to the Consumer |
| Whether Consumer Direct negligently failed to train or supervise Lang | Swanson: Consumer Direct had affirmative duties to train/supervise and therefore can be sued | Consumer Direct: Regulations place scheduling, training, supervision responsibility on the Consumer; no record evidence Consumer Direct assumed those duties | Held for Consumer Direct — no evidence Consumer Direct assumed supervisory/training duties and statute covers related liability |
| Whether public‑policy or federal arguments save Swanson’s claims | Swanson: Public policy supports allowing suit against Consumer Direct; alluded to federal preemption | Consumer Direct: Statutory scheme and regulations control the allocation of liability; preemption not developed | Held for Consumer Direct — court declined to rewrite legislative policy; did not address undeveloped preemption claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2013 MT 354 (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Woods v. State, 2015 MT 8 (statutory law supersedes common law)
- Clark Fork Coal. v. Tubbs, 2016 MT 229 (use plain statutory language to determine legislative intent)
- Satterlee v. Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co., 2009 MT 368 (policy choices better left to the legislature)