Swanson v. Cnty. of Riverside
248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 476
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Brandon M. was held on a 72-hour involuntary psychiatric hold under Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150, then released before the 72 hours elapsed; shortly after release he killed three people.
- Surviving family members (Respondents) sued the County of Riverside for negligence, alleging premature discharge and failures to evaluate/monitor under § 5152.
- The County filed an anti‑SLAPP special motion to strike under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, arguing the LPS Act procedures are an “official proceeding authorized by law” and that its evaluation/discharge decision was protected petitioning/speech.
- The trial court denied the County’s motion; the County appealed the denial.
- The County submitted psychiatrist declarations describing multidisciplinary assessment and 15‑minute checks; Respondents disputed the declarations and relied on deposition inconsistencies.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the County’s conduct (the decision to discharge) was not protected speech or petitioning activity under the anti‑SLAPP statute, so the motion to strike failed on the first prong.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LPS Act § 5152 procedures constitute an “official proceeding authorized by law” under § 425.16(e) | Respondents: The LPS Act procedures are not the sort of public, quasi‑judicial peer review proceedings the anti‑SLAPP statute protects. | County: Section 5152 is a statutorily governed official proceeding; evaluations/discharge decisions are statements in connection with that proceeding and thus protected. | Court: Doubts that § 5152 is an "official proceeding" like peer‑review, but resolution unnecessary because the conduct was not protected speech. |
| Whether the County’s evaluation/discharge decision is protected “written or oral statement” under § 425.16(e)(1)–(2) | Respondents: The complaint challenges the discharge decision (negligence), not protected speech; the decision is the wrongful act, not a petition/speech. | County: The discharge/evaluation is a statement (recommendation/order) made in connection with the LPS Act and therefore protected. | Court: The gravamen is negligence in releasing Brandon; the decision itself is not protected speech and anti‑SLAPP does not apply. |
| Whether the complaint arises from conduct in furtherance of petition/speech rights (first prong of anti‑SLAPP) | Respondents: No; claims arise from negligent act (release), not from petitioning or speech activity. | County: Yes; actions arose from LPS Act procedures and communications in official proceedings. | Court: First prong not satisfied — the action does not arise from protected activity. |
| Whether plaintiffs showed a probability of prevailing (second prong of anti‑SLAPP) | Respondents: N/A at appeal stage because court found first prong not met. | County: Argued various immunity defenses and insufficiency of evidence. | Court: Declined to decide because anti‑SLAPP first prong failed; left merits and immunity issues for trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist., 39 Cal.4th 192 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (hospital peer‑review proceedings characterized as an "official proceeding authorized by law" under anti‑SLAPP analysis)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (defendant bears burden to show challenged allegations arise from protected activity; two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
- Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (distinguishing protected speech from governmental decisions and clarifying when conduct "arises from" petition/speech)
- Julian v. Mission Community Hospital, 11 Cal.App.5th 360 (Ct. App. 2017) (LPS Act enforcement context and remedies available apart from a private right to enforce § 5152)
- Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (public nature of official proceedings can create public‑issue protection under anti‑SLAPP)