SWANSON Et Al. v. TACKLING Et Al., 335 Ga. App. 810

On April 26, 2012, seven-year-old J.R. visited the Swansons' home and was introduced to two great danes, Gussy and Willow; Willow barked in J.R.'s face during the introduction but did not bite then.
The next morning, after Julia Swanson bought stuffed toys for the dogs, J.R. offered a toy to Willow in the sunroom; Willow immediately bit his arm and then bit his head, causing serious injuries.
Tackling (J.R.'s mother) sued the Swansons for personal injuries on theories including premises liability and dangerous-animal liability, alleging the Swansons knew of Willow’s vicious propensities.
The Swansons moved for summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence Willow had ever bitten, attacked, or otherwise shown a propensity to injure people before this incident.
The trial court denied summary judgment; the Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review and reversed, finding no evidence of prior similar incidents or an undertaken duty to restrain the dog.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether owners had superior knowledge of dog’s vicious propensity to impose liability under OCGA §§ 51-2-7 / 51-3-1	Tackling: Swansons knew Willow was protective of toys and would “go after” them, which put them on notice she might bite a child	Swansons: No evidence of any prior biting, attacking, or similar conduct; mere barking/toy play is not a vicious propensity	Reversed: No evidence of prior incident of the same type; barking/play fetching insufficient to show propensity or put owners on notice
Whether the Swansons voluntarily undertook to restrain Willow, creating liability if breached	Tackling: She told Day she did not want Willow loose around J.R.; this reflects an expectation the dog would be restrained	Swansons: No evidence they promised to restrain Willow or that Tackling asked them to do so; no affirmative undertaking	Held: No evidence of an affirmative promise or reasonable reliance; voluntary-undertaking theory fails
Whether Green v. Wilson compels denial of summary judgment here	Tackling: Green shows owners can be liable even without identical prior conduct if other aggressive incidents existed	Swansons: Green is distinguishable because Green involved a prior aggressive lunge that was similar enough to raise a triable issue	Held: Green distinguishable; unlike Green, no prior incident here that would lead a prudent person to anticipate the bite

Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray, 316 Ga. App. 193 (2012) (animal-owner liability requires evidence of vicious propensity; clinic entitled to summary judgment where dog had no prior bites)
Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425 (2012) (a prior incident must be of the same type to place owner on notice; voluntary-undertaking liability requires reasonable reliance)
Green v. Wilson, 333 Ga. App. 631 (2015) (evidence that a dog lunged aggressively while restrained can create a jury issue about foreseeability of similar unrestrained conduct)
Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316 (2008) (owners entitled to summary judgment when dog had no prior attacks or bites and owners lacked superior knowledge)
Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1 (2009) (to infer owner knowledge there must be at least one prior incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate the injurious event)