Swain v. Harris (Slip Opinion)
150 Ohio St. 3d 459
| Ohio | 2017Background
- Sean Swain was convicted of aggravated murder in 1991; that conviction was reversed on appeal and the case remanded for further proceedings.
- In 1995 Swain was retried, convicted of murder and aggravated murder, and sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 20 years; the aggravated-murder sentence is the operative sentence he is serving.
- In 2016 Swain filed a habeas corpus petition in the Twelfth District, arguing the trial court on remand lacked jurisdiction because it (1) exceeded the appellate mandate by re‑analyzing admissibility of expert testimony, and (2) tried him on a murder charge the state had earlier dismissed and never reindicted. He also asserted actual innocence.
- The warden moved to dismiss; the court of appeals granted the motion, finding Swain had been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction and had adequate remedies at law (direct appeal and postconviction relief).
- The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals: habeas lies only to challenge jurisdictional defects (or rare nonjurisdictional errors where no adequate remedy exists), Swain’s claims were nonjurisdictional and reviewable on direct appeal or postconviction, and any alleged defect as to the murder count did not entitle him to release because he was not sentenced on that count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court exceeded appellate mandate by reassessing expert‑testimony admissibility on remand | Trial court violated the mandate by reexamining expert testimony and excluding it under Evid.R. 405 | The trial court acted within the remand; it could apply rules of evidence and its evidentiary rulings were subject to direct appeal | Court: No jurisdictional defect; evidentiary ruling was nonjurisdictional and reviewable on direct appeal; habeas improper |
| Whether trial court lacked jurisdiction to try murder in 1995 because state voluntarily dismissed murder charge in 1991 and never reindicted | Swain contends murder prosecution was void for lack of indictment and so retrial on that charge was jurisdictionally invalid | State: Even if murder conviction were invalid, Swain was not sentenced on that count; habeas relief not warranted for a count that did not produce the sentence served | Court: No habeas relief; petitioner not imprisoned on the murder count; lack of sentencing on that count does not entitle release |
| Whether Swain’s claim of actual innocence permits habeas relief despite available remedies | Swain asserts actual innocence as a basis for habeas because other remedies are inadequate | Warden argues adequate remedies existed (direct appeal, postconviction), so habeas is improper | Court: Actual‑innocence claim did not remove requirement to use available remedies; habeas denied |
| Whether there was any adequate remedy at law preventing habeas relief | Swain argues remand and trial-court actions left him without adequate appellate remedy | Warden: Swain had direct appeal and postconviction remedies and in fact raised the evidentiary issue on direct appeal | Court: Adequate remedies existed; habeas unavailable except for jurisdictional defects |
Key Cases Cited
- Appenzeller v. Miller, 136 Ohio St.3d 378, 2013-Ohio-3719, 996 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio 2013) (habeas lies only to challenge sentencing-court jurisdiction; nonjurisdictional errors require adequate remedies at law)
- Haynes v. Voorhies, 110 Ohio St.3d 243, 2006-Ohio-4355, 852 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio 2006) (release is not warranted in habeas where petitioner is incarcerated for other validly sentenced offenses)
- Kneuss v. Sloan, 146 Ohio St.3d 248, 2016-Ohio-3310, 54 N.E.3d 1242 (Ohio 2016) (actual-innocence claims do not bypass ordinary remedies when those remedies are adequate)
- State ex rel. Heck v. Kessler, 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 647 N.E.2d 792 (Ohio 1995) (trial court lacks jurisdiction to depart from a higher court’s mandate)
- United States v. Peters, 937 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussed remand procedure for evaluating whether excluded testimony would have been admissible)