284 So.3d 1107
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2019Background
- On June 16, 2013, Scott Winckler alleges a GSX-R Suzuki motorcycle experienced brake failure, causing a crash that left him paralyzed; Suzuki later issued a brake-related recall for GSX-R models.
- Winckler sued Suzuki Motor Corporation (a Japanese corporation) for products liability and, during discovery, sought a letter rogatory to depose Osamu Suzuki, Suzuki’s chairman and former CEO, in Japan.
- Winckler alleged the chairman had unique knowledge based on his involvement with a document and related email concerning the brake issue; Suzuki produced a sworn declaration from Osamu Suzuki stating he had no independent recollection or personal knowledge of the document and lacked authority over the Quality Countermeasure Committee decisions.
- The trial court granted the letter rogatory, ruling the apex doctrine (protecting high officials from deposition) has been applied only in the governmental context in Florida and thus did not bar deposing a corporate chairman; the court also found documentary evidence of the chairman’s personal involvement and that his testimony was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.
- Suzuki petitioned for writ of certiorari arguing the order departed from essential requirements of law; the First DCA denied the petition (majority) because no Florida authority clearly establishes the apex doctrine in the corporate context and the trial court cited documentary support for its ruling.
- Judge Thomas dissented, arguing the apex doctrine should apply equally to corporate officials to prevent abusive discovery and that the record (sworn denial of knowledge, extensive prior discovery of corporate representative, failure to depose the relevant committee) showed no legitimate basis for deposing the chairman.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Winckler) | Defendant's Argument (Suzuki) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the apex doctrine bars deposition of a high-ranking corporate officer | Chairman uniquely able to provide relevant information; his deposition is necessary | Apex doctrine protects top executives when others can provide information; Osamu Suzuki lacks unique knowledge | Denied: apex doctrine not clearly established in Florida for corporate context; trial court did not depart from law |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in finding chairman personally involved with recall documents | Document and email show personal involvement warranting deposition | Chairman’s sworn declaration denies personal knowledge or involvement; less intrusive discovery available | Denied: trial court cited documentary support for personal involvement and discovery was reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence |
| Whether the order departs from essential requirements of law such that certiorari relief is warranted | Extraordinary relief appropriate to prevent abusive discovery of busy executive | No clearly established law applying apex in corporate setting; error not a clear legal departure | Denied: petition fails first prong of certiorari review (no clearly established legal principle violated) |
| Whether discovery will cause irreparable harm remedied only by certiorari | Deposing chairman would disrupt corporate functioning and create settlement pressure | No showing of clearly established law prohibiting deposition; trial court can manage discovery burdens | Denied by majority; dissent would grant certiorari and protective order |
Key Cases Cited
- Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cty., 810 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (articulates apex doctrine for high-ranking governmental officials)
- Horne v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 901 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (apex protection requires showing of personal involvement or extraordinary circumstances)
- Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation v. Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 159 So.3d 945 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (discusses apex doctrine at length and declines to decide corporate application)
- Univ. of W. Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Habegger, 125 So.3d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (concerns intrusion on high officials and potential widespread ramifications of deposing them)
- Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Atl. Hosp. of Fla., LLC, 57 So.3d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (denying deposition of a corporate president lacking personal knowledge)
- State v. Belvin, 986 So.2d 516 (Fla. 2008) (defines "departure from the essential requirements of law" standard for certiorari review)