Suzanna Eckchum A/K/A Susan Eckhert v. State
03-15-00270-CV
Tex. App.Nov 30, 2015Background
- Appellant Suzanna Eckchum was subject to a lifetime Stalking Protective Order (entered in Comal County) after a hearing initiated by “The State of Texas for the Protection of Hal Ketchum.”
- The State’s application invoked the Texas Family Code (Chapter 85) and pleaded family-violence grounds; the trial court entered a lifetime Stalking Protective Order under the criminal-procedure stalking statute (Code Crim. Proc. ch. 7A).
- At trial the State’s evidence consisted largely of Hal Ketchum’s uncorroborated testimony alleging threats, encounters at public events, and that a prior 1997 Tennessee restraining order existed; no documentary proof of any Tennessee order was produced.
- Appellant contested (1) jurisdiction/pleading defect (that the relief awarded did not conform to the pleaded family-violence application), (2) legal and factual sufficiency to prove stalking (no threats, no directed course of conduct, missing mental-state proof), (3) First Amendment intrusion on photography/reporting, and (4) due-process error from allegedly false testimony about a prior Tennessee order.
- Procedural disputes: appellant raised constitutional and sufficiency arguments in post-trial proceedings and argued the trial court curtailed argument; State contends various waivers and preservation failures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State/Hal) | Defendant's Argument (Eckchum) | Held / Disposition (as argued in brief) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a lifetime stalking PO when the pleading sought relief under the Family Code | The State treated the application as stalking-based and contends no defect in pleading prevented relief | Eckchum: pleading invoked Chapter 85 Family Code (no request for §7A stalking relief or lifetime duration); relief granted differs from pleaded relief so order is void for lack of jurisdiction | Eckchum argues the PO is void because the judgment granted relief not invoked by the pleadings (trial court lacked authority to enter lifetime stalking PO) |
| Legal/factual sufficiency to prove stalking under Tex. Penal Code §42.072 (threat + subjective + objective) | State: conduct (photographs, appearances, gestures) constituted explicit or implicit threats and a course of conduct causing great fear | Eckchum: record lacks any threats, no evidence she knew or should have known Hal perceived threats, no directed scheme toward Hal, mere presence/photography is protected speech | Eckchum argues evidence is legally/factually insufficient—no threats, no specific targeting, thus stalking not proven |
| First Amendment and photography/reporting activity | State: Eckchum’s photography/appearances placed Hal in great fear, justifying restrictions | Eckchum: taking photographs for publication is communicative speech with an audience and protected; First Amendment does not depend on speaker’s commercial success | Eckchum argues the Order unlawfully infringes protected expressive conduct and the State cites no authority limiting protection by speaker’s earnings |
| Due process / false testimony about prior Tennessee restraining order | State relies on Hal’s testimony about a prior 1997 restraining order to bolster danger history | Eckchum: Tennessee had no stalking/protective order statute in 1997; Hal’s testimony was false and the State failed to correct or produce documentary evidence, violating due process | Eckchum contends false/unrebutted testimony infected the proceeding and deprived her of a fair hearing |
| Procedural preservation / waiver / findings / bills of exception | State: Eckchum waived many grounds by not plainly raising them at trial or via formal procedures | Eckchum: raised constitutional and sufficiency concerns in motion for new trial and at hearing; trial court ruled and curtailed argument; preservation rules satisfied and jurisdictional defects are never waived | Eckchum asserts appellate review is preserved; jurisdictional and due-process claims may be raised at any time |
Key Cases Cited
- Perez v. Briercroft Serv. Corp., 809 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1991) (pleadings must give notice of relief sought)
- Hubbard v. Lagow, 576 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1979) (trial court’s jurisdiction is invoked by pleadings; judgment beyond pleadings may be void)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (definition of when a judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction)
- Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (prior stalking statute held unconstitutionally vague; legislature narrowed statute to require threatening conduct)
- Ploeger v. State, 189 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) (interpretation of stalking statute elements and evidence required to show directed course of conduct)
- Clarke v. State, 270 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (clarifies preservation; clear communication to trial court suffices to preserve constitutional claims)
- Ex parte Ghahremani, 332 S.W.3d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (State’s failure to correct known false testimony can violate due process)
