756 F.3d 527
7th Cir.2014Background
- Gienapp worked at Harbor Crest, a nursing facility in Fulton, Illinois, and took FMLA leave in January 2011 to care for her daughter with a serious health condition.
- Harbor Crest granted the leave but Gienapp left the blank on the return-date question in the FMLA form and there was no written follow-up asking for a return date.
- A physician stated the daughter’s recovery was uncertain and could require care at least through July 2011, and Harbor Crest inferred a return date of around April 1, 2011.
- In mid-February 2011 Harbor Crest hired a replacement after concluding Gienapp would not return by April 1, 2011, and Gienapp later reported to work on March 29, only to be told she had lost her job.
- Gienapp challenged the summary judgment ruling that she forfeited FMLA rights by not providing an exact return date; the district court’s decision rested on misreading §825.303 and notice requirements.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that (i) unforeseeable leave under §825.303 does not require a precise return date, (ii) care for a grandchild can count as care under the FMLA when it benefits the covered family member, and (iii) Hoff qualifies as a covered daughter under the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gienapp’s failure to provide a exact return date breached §825.303 | Gienapp complied with notice; §825.303 does not require a definite date | Harbor Crest relied on the blank return-date box and the firm date implied by the form | No; summary judgment improper under §825.303 |
| Whether care of Hoff’s grandchildren counts as ‘care’ under FMLA to qualify for leave | Care for Hoff’s child and grandchildren falls within ‘care’ | Grandchildren care is outside the statutory scope | Yes; care of grandchildren can count if it aids the covered relative’s health |
| Whether Hoff qualifies as a ‘daughter’ under the FMLA definition | Hoff is a biological child with status meeting the statutory definition | Hoff’s emancipation and marriage exclude her from the definition | Yes; Hoff meets the statutory definition as a daughter despite emancipation/marriage |
| Whether Harbor Crest’s additional arguments justify summary judgment | Gienapp provided care that could benefit Hoff | Gienapp did not provide required information or care | No; factual disputes remain precluding summary judgment (reversed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ballard v. Chicago Park District, 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014) (defeat of restrictive reading of FMLA care definition; expands care as including psychological benefits)
- Righi v. SMC Corp., 632 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2011) (notice requirements under §825.302; discussion of employer inquiries when information is inadequate)
- Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (U.S. 2014) (statutory interpretation; cannot add qualifiers beyond text)