220 A.3d 1027
Pa.2019Background
- In Feb 2018 a DOC guard was killed after an inmate kicked him with Timberland-style boots; DOC suspended commissary sales of Timberland and Rocky boots and, by March 26, 2018 memorandum, banned future purchases and ordered inmates to send existing pairs home or turn them in by May 11, 2018.
- Sutton, a pro se inmate, alleged he bought Timberland boots through commissary (≈$99) and that the Memorandum would confiscate his boots without compensation; he filed a petition in Commonwealth Court seeking return of the boots or a refund and alleging violations of due process, the UTPCPL, and conversion.
- Commonwealth Court treated the pleading as a petition for review, sustained DOC’s preliminary objections (demurrer), and dismissed Sutton’s claims, relying on O’Toole v. Dep’t of Corr.
- Sutton appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which accepted issues preserved on appeal: procedural due process, substantive due process (Turner analysis), conversion (sovereign immunity), and UTPCPL claims.
- The Supreme Court treated Sutton’s factual allegations as true for demurrer review and considered whether the Memorandum was legislative vs. adjudicative, whether the restriction was reasonably related to penological interests, whether sovereign immunity barred conversion, and whether UTPCPL claims were adequately pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural due process: Did DOC deprive Sutton of property without due process? | Sutton: confiscation of purchased boots without adequate process violates due process. | DOC: Memorandum is a legislative policy binding a broad class; procedural due process applies only to adjudications. | Held: Memorandum is legislative; procedural due process not implicated. |
| Substantive due process: Is the ban arbitrary or unrelated to penological interests? | Sutton: ban is an exaggerated overreaction to an isolated incident and arbitrary/irrational. | DOC: Ban is reasonably related to legitimate safety interests after a deadly assault involving the boots; Turner factors satisfied. | Held: Restrictions are reasonably related to penological interests under Turner; substantive due process claim fails. |
| Conversion and sovereign immunity: Can Sutton recover for conversion? | Sutton: sovereign immunity waiver for ‘‘care and custody’’ claims allows conversion suit. | DOC: Conversion is an intentional tort, not negligence; sovereign immunity not waived for intentional acts done within scope of duties. | Held: Claim fails; no waiver for intentional conversion and memorandum issued within employees’ duties. |
| UTPCPL: Did DOC engage in unfair or deceptive consumer practices? | Sutton: accepting money then confiscating boots without refund violates UTPCPL. | DOC: No facts alleging deceptive practices, misrepresentation, or statutory violations. | Held: UTPCPL claim waived/insufficiently pleaded; dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; four-factor test)
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (deference to prison administrators to ensure safety and security)
- Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1998) (distinguishes legislative prison policy from adjudicative action for procedural due process)
- Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (burden on inmate to disprove reasonable relation of regulation to penological interests)
- O’Toole v. Dep’t of Corr., 196 A.3d 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (upholding DOC’s ban on Timberland/Rocky boots as rational safety measure)
- Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551 (Pa. 2018) (procedural due process is flexible; courts accept well-pleaded facts on demurrer review)
- Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1982) (conversion is an intentional tort, not negligence)
- Justice v. Lombardo, 208 A.3d 1057 (Pa. 2019) (scope-of-duty analysis for intentional acts and sovereign immunity)