Sutch, R. v. Roxborough Memorial, 142 A.3d 38

Background

In May 2007 Rosalind Wilson presented to Roxborough Memorial Hospital; imaging revealed a pulmonary nodule that was not worked up with CT and she was not informed; she was later diagnosed with metastatic lung cancer and died in July 2009.
Plaintiff sued multiple defendants for malpractice; trial began May 2012 after pretrial orders precluding any evidence or argument about the decedent’s smoking history (May 16, 2012 order, entered by agreement), with bifurcation previously considered.
During defense expert testimony on May 31, 2012, Dr. Kelly (defense expert) volunteered that the decedent was a smoker in response to a question about cardiac risk factors; the trial court admonished the jury and gave a curative instruction; plaintiff later obtained a new trial.
Plaintiff moved for sanctions and contempt against defense counsel Nancy Raynor (and others), alleging failure to warn the expert about the smoking preclusion; hearings were held in 2014–2015 focused on whether Raynor should be sanctioned; the court found Raynor in civil contempt and awarded $946,197.16 in fees and expenses without a full hearing on reasonableness.
On appeal the Superior Court reversed: it held the May 16, 2012 preclusion order was not sufficiently specific to support contempt as applied; plaintiff bore the burden to prove contempt (notice, volitional act, wrongful intent) and failed to meet it; the court also found procedural and evidentiary errors and vacated the sanctions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Raynor's Argument	Held
Whether Raynor was properly held in civil contempt for violating the smoking preclusion order	Raynor failed to warn her expert and thus caused the prohibited testimony; contempt is warranted	The preclusion order did not expressly require counsel to warn witnesses before they testified; plaintiff failed to prove notice, volitional violation, or wrongful intent	Reversed — plaintiff failed to prove contempt; the order was not definite, and ambiguities construed in favor of Raynor
Whether the trial court shifted the burden improperly	Court permissibly relied on Dr. Kelly’s trial statements to infer Raynor’s failure	Plaintiff bore the burden to prove contempt; the court improperly shifted burden to Raynor to prove she warned the witness	Reversed — improper burden-shifting; plaintiff must prove contempt elements
Admissibility/use of Dr. Kelly’s prior trial testimony at contempt hearing	Prior on-the-record statements were party admissions/obdurate acts and admissible	Using the 2012 transcript against Raynor was hearsay and denied her a full and fair earlier opportunity to cross-examine	Held error — reliance on prior testimony (without same‑opportunity cross) raised hearsay/due-process problems
Reasonableness and process for awarding nearly $1M in sanctions and counsel fees	Fees compensate plaintiff for costs and losses caused by the violation; no separate hearing required on amount	Award was punitive, unsupported, and excessive; no evidentiary hearing held on reasonableness or Raynor’s ability to pay; many fees were contingent/unbilled	Vacated — award unsupported by evidence; court abused discretion by imposing large sanctions without an adequate hearing or evidentiary foundation

Key Cases Cited

Mrozek v. James, 780 A.2d 670 (Pa. Super. 2001) (standard of appellate review and contempt principles)
Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478 (Pa. Super. 2006) (civil‑vs‑criminal contempt factors and requirement that the underlying order be definite, clear, and specific)
In re Contempt of Cullen, 849 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. 2004) (due process requirements in contempt proceedings)
MacDougall v. MacDougall, 49 A.3d 890 (Pa. Super. 2012) (burden on complainant to prove contempt)
Township of South Strabane v. Piecknick, 686 A.2d 1297 (Pa. 1996) (Section 2503(7) fees require specific finding of dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious conduct)
Schnabel Assocs., Inc. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 487 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Super. 1985) (limits on converting civil contempt into punishment; consider contemnor’s ability to comply)
Gilmore by Gilmore v. Dondero, 582 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 1990) (factors for evaluating reasonableness of attorney fees)