SUSMAN GODFREY LLP v. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 1:25-cv-01107

Background

In April 2025 President Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,263 targeting Susman Godfrey LLP, alleging the firm “weaponize[d]” the legal system, funded groups undermining the military, and engaged in unlawful race-based practices.
The Order’s operative provisions instructed (inter alia) immediate review/suspension of Susman employees’ security clearances; required government contractors to disclose and potentially terminate business with Susman; cross-referenced EEOC/DOJ reviews of large law firms; and directed limits on Susman employees’ access to federal buildings and a presumption against hiring them.
Susman sued on April 11, 2025, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the court granted a TRO enjoining Sections 1, 3, and 5 and then converted the dispute to summary judgment briefing. Related, nearly identical Executive Orders were issued against other firms and similarly enjoined in this district.
Susman pleaded ten counts (First Amendment retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, petition/association; Spending Clause/unconstitutional conditions; Fifth Amendment due process, vagueness, fair notice, right to counsel, equal protection; separation of powers/ultra vires). Defendants moved to dismiss; Susman moved for summary judgment.
The court found no genuine dispute of material fact, granted Susman summary judgment on Counts I–IV and VI–X, held the Order unconstitutional in multiple respects, and entered permanent injunctive and declaratory relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Section 1 is nonactionable government speech	Section 1’s findings are the predicate for coercive implementation and cause reputational and operational harm; therefore they are actionable	Section 1 is government speech and immune from First Amendment challenge	Court: Section 1 is actionable; plaintiffs may challenge reliance on those findings as coercive state action
Reviewability and ripeness of Section 2 (blanket suspension of security clearances)	Lee does not bar constitutional challenge to a blanket, non‑individualized policy; injury occurs immediately on order’s issuance	Security‑clearance decisions are committed to executive discretion and nonjusticiable; disputes are unripe until agencies act	Court: Lee does not foreclose review here; the claim is ripe and justiciable because the Order imposes immediate, non‑individualized injurious action
Section 3 compelled disclosures/contracting — freedom of association and contractual harms	Disclosure requirement and directive to terminate contracts chill client relationships and associational rights; irreparable business harm	Disclosure is limited, foreseeable in contracting context, and tied to legitimate procurement/national‑interest goals	Court: Compelled disclosure fails exacting scrutiny; Susman has standing; Section 3 violates First Amendment associational and related rights
Section 5 limits on access/hiring — petition, right to counsel, and ripeness	Section 5 will (and on hiring already does) exclude Susman employees from federal employment, buildings, and interactions, impairing petition and counsel rights	Guidance not yet issued; hypothetical national‑security interests may justify future tailored restrictions	Court: Section 5(b) is ripe; access/hiring limits threaten petition and right‑to‑counsel protections and are unconstitutional when tied to retaliatory findings
Due process and vagueness of the Order	Order deprives Susman of liberty, reputation, contracts, and profession without notice or opportunity to be heard; terms like “inconsistent with the interests of the United States” are impermissibly vague	Order contemplates agency guidance; enforcement details unknown; no unfair surprise	Court: Stringent vagueness test applies (First Amendment implications); Order is unconstitutionally vague and deprived Susman of due process
Equal protection / class‑of‑one and separation of powers / ultra vires	Susman is singled out without rational basis; President lacks statutory or constitutional authority to punish a law firm for protected speech; Order encroaches on judicial functions	Government has discretion in choosing contractors and protecting national/security and civil‑rights interests	Court: No rational basis shown; actions are ultra vires and intrude on judicial authority; separation‑of‑powers violated

Key Cases Cited

National Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175 (2024) (government may not use state power to punish disfavored expression)
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (government speech doctrine)
Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (courtroom advocacy and legal advice implicate First Amendment and independence of the bar)
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (political speech and corporate donations protected by First Amendment)
Lee v. Garland, 120 F.4th 880 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (individual security‑clearance denial may be nonjusticiable)
Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (standard for First Amendment retaliation claims)
Umbehr v. McClure, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (contractors have some First Amendment protection; government interests weighed when government acts as employer/contractor)
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (presidential power must stem from Constitution or statute)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vagueness doctrine and First Amendment‑sensitive vagueness scrutiny)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (framework for required procedural protections)