Susan Stewart, Personal Representative of the Estate of Joanne Hatton v. Arthur Alunday, M.D.
2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 130
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Susan Stewart, personal representative of Joanne Hatton’s estate, sued Dr. Arthur Alunday for medical malpractice after Hatton developed a widespread MRSA infection and died following a kyphoplasty for an L2 compression fracture.
- Hatton had been treated for MRSA bacteremia with vancomycin; Dr. Alunday ordered a repeat blood culture (negative) and relied on a prior MRI (no infection) before clearing her for kyphoplasty.
- At trial, portions of an attorney-prepared Medical Review Panel summary (Exhibit 5) were introduced; cross-examination elicited the excerpted statements that (a) a reasonable physician should consider MRSA seeding to a fracture and (b) “MRSA in fracture did not cross his mind at all.”
- Plaintiff moved for judgment on the evidence, arguing those admissions constituted a judicial admission that Dr. Alunday breached the standard of care, leaving only causation and damages to the jury; the trial court denied the motion and the jury returned a verdict for Dr. Alunday.
- On motion to correct errors the trial court found Dr. Alunday made a judicial admission but applied precedent treating such admissions as evidence to be weighed by the jury; the court of appeals reviewed whether (1) judicial admissions are conclusive and (2) whether Dr. Alunday actually made one.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial admissions are conclusive and binding | Judicial admissions are conclusive; if Dr. Alunday made one, the issue of breach should be removed from the jury | Prior cases treated similar admissions as matters for the jury to weigh | Court clarified: judicial admissions are conclusive and binding (distinguished from evidentiary admissions) |
| Whether Dr. Alunday’s trial testimony constituted a judicial admission that he breached the standard of care | Cross-examined excerpts show Alunday admitted he didn’t consider MRSA seeding and agreed failure to consider it would be below the standard of care | Alunday testified elsewhere that he did consider MRSA, relied on negative blood culture and MRI, and expressly testified he met the standard of care; the “MRSA did not cross his mind” text was attorney summary, not his sworn admission | No judicial admission: considering his testimony as a whole, he did not clearly and unequivocally concede breach; denial of judgment on the evidence affirmed |
| Effect of attorney-prepared Medical Review Panel summary introduced at trial | Plaintiff treated statements in the summary as party admissions | Defendant pointed out the summary was attorney work product and not a sworn pleading or admission by Alunday | Court treated the summary statements cautiously: they were not binding admissions by Alunday absent his clear, unequivocal assent |
| Whether trial court’s prior reliance on cases treating admissions as weighty evidence was correct | Plaintiff argued those cases were wrong and judicial admissions must be treated as conclusive | Defendant relied on those precedents to argue jury could weigh the statements | Court overruled the portion of precedent conflating judicial and evidentiary admissions and clarified judicial admissions are conclusive, but here none occurred |
Key Cases Cited
- Lutz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 848 N.E.2d 675 (Ind. 2006) (judicial admissions may be taken as true and are conclusive as to the party)
- Weinberger v. Boyer, 956 N.E.2d 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (discussed and partially disapproved insofar as it blurred judicial and evidentiary admissions)
- Waugh v. Kelly, 555 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (earlier decision that conflated standards for judicial and evidentiary admissions)
- Warner Gear Co. v. De Peugh, 123 N.E. 363 (Ind. App. 1919) (statement-against-interest/evidentiary-admission precedent relied on by Waugh)