Susan Ryan v. napier/klein
425 P.3d 230
Ariz.2018Background
- Nighttime traffic stop escalated when Deputy Klein, commanding a police dog (Barry), intentionally released the dog to bite Brian McDonald after a pursuit; the dog held McDonald for 25–38 seconds, causing severe injuries. McDonald was experiencing hypoglycemia and was nonresponsive to commands.
- McDonald sued only for negligence (not battery or § 1983), alleging Klein "negligently released" the dog and used negligent/excessive force; the Sheriff was sued vicariously.
- Trial court denied defendants’ summary-judgment motion that argued an intentional use of force cannot constitute negligence; jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded damages. Defendants appealed.
- The court of appeals affirmed, allowing a negligence theory based on Klein’s evaluation to release the dog and holding § 13-409 did not apply to negligence claims; it also permitted expert testimony invoking Graham v. Connor factors.
- The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether intentional use of force can be pled as negligence, (2) whether § 13-409 applies in negligence cases and who bears the burden on justification, and (3) limits on expert testimony referencing Graham.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ryan/McDonald) | Defendant's Argument (Napier/Klein) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an officer’s intentional use of force can be the basis of a negligence claim | McDonald: officer’s intentional release can be framed as "negligent use of force" (or negligent evaluation to use force) | Defendants: intentional acts (battery) cannot simultaneously be negligence; intentional release is an intentional tort | Held: Intentional acts producing harmful/offensive contact cannot be negligence; plaintiff’s only supported claim was battery, not negligence. |
| Whether negligence can be based on an officer’s internal evaluation/decision to use force | McDonald: negligence may lie in the officer’s evaluation or decision process even if force is intentional | Defendants: the internal decision is part of the intentional act and not a separate negligent "act" | Held: An officer’s internal evaluation/decision is not an external negligent act; negligence must be based on conduct distinct from the intentional use of force. |
| Applicability of A.R.S. § 13-409 (justification) to negligence claims | McDonald/court of appeals: § 13-409 should not automatically apply to negligence theories | Defendants: § 13-409 justification should immunize officers when force was reasonable, regardless of tort label | Held: § 13-409 is inapplicable (and unnecessary) when the only claim is negligence; if battery is pleaded, § 13-409 applies to the battery claim only. |
| Burden of proof for justification in civil cases | McDonald: legislature’s 2006 revision of § 13-205 may shift burden to plaintiff to disprove justification | Defendants: statute changes burden such that plaintiff must disprove justification in civil cases | Held: In civil cases, defendant bears burden to prove a justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence; § 13-205 did not change common-law allocation. |
| Admissibility of expert testimony invoking Graham v. Connor factors | McDonald: experts may explain Graham factors and say officer violated them to show unreasonableness | Defendants: permitting experts to tell the jury Graham controls usurps the court’s role and confuses jury | Held: Experts may describe and rely on Graham factors in forming opinions but must not tell or suggest Graham is the legal standard governing § 13-409; experts should avoid presenting Graham as controlling law or unduly referencing the Supreme Court source. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Fourth Amendment excessive-force factors)
- Ryan v. Napier, 243 Ariz. 277 (Ct. App.) (court of appeals decision reviewed and vacated)
- Clouse ex rel. Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196 (negligence by law enforcement recognized in other contexts)
- Transamerica Ins. v. Meere, 143 Ariz. 351 (distinguishing negligence from intent)
- Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, 607 A.2d 418 (Conn.) (discussion that intentional and negligent torts are mutually exclusive)
- Chinn v. District of Columbia, 839 A.2d 701 (D.C.) (negligence distinct from intentional use of force; negligence must be independent act)