Susan Janysek Pauler, Vincent G. Janysek, Jr., Clare Janysek Smith, and Michael J. Janysek, Co-Trustees of the Janysek Family Mineral Trust, and Patrick Janysek, Susan Janysek Pauler and Richard J. Janysek, Trustees of the Janysek Survivor's Trust, and Stephen M. Janysek, Lucy Janysek Matejek, Kathryn Janysek Kopecki, Richard J. Janysek, and Patrick Janysek, Trustees of the 2015 Janysek Family Mineral Trust v. M & L Minerals, LP, Dorothy Moczygemba, Wilbert Lee Moczygemba, Alvin D. Moczygemba, Evelyn Michalec, Gene Moczygemba, Ewit Woelfel LP., Lori Wiatrek, Barbara Banduch, Albert Janysek, Lorraine Janysek, Deborah Arfele, Martin Jendrusch, Bernadette Jendrusch, Alan Jendrusch, Denise Jendrusch, Carol Wehlmann, Helen Malik, Carl Janysek, Donna M. Perry, Benny Janysek, 04-20-00302-CV

Background

In 1925 Susan and Edward Janysek acquired a 197‑acre tract in Karnes County.
In 1958–59 they conveyed term royalty interests (1/4 for ten years and thereafter as produced; 1/8 similarly) and in 1959 conveyed nine 1/24 nonparticipating royalty interests to their children; those term royalties later expired.
In 1977 Susan (widow) and eight children executed a general warranty deed to Vincent and his wife that conveyed “All that certain tract or parcel of land,” contained a clause that the conveyance was “subject, however, to all mineral conveyances…of record,” and separately reserved a 1/4 nonparticipating royalty to Susan for life with reversion to the children.
Lessee interpreted the 1977 Deed as conveying the disputed Term Royalty Interests and 1/24 royalties; successors to the grantors (the “Moczygembas”) sued for declaratory judgment that those royalties were excepted from the 1977 conveyance; the grantee successors (the “Janyseks”) asserted the opposite.
On cross‑motions for summary judgment the trial court held the disputed royalties were excepted from conveyance in favor of the Moczygembas; the Fourth Court reversed and rendered judgment that the Moczygembas take nothing on their declaratory claim and remanded for any remaining counterclaims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Moczygembas)	Defendant's Argument (Janyseks)	Held
Whether the deed’s “subject to … of record” language excepted/reserved the disputed Term Royalty and 1/24 royalty interests from conveyance	The "subject to" reference and phrase "in addition to the above exceptions" show the grantors excepted those recorded royalty interests	The language merely acknowledges outstanding recorded interests and the general warranty deed conveyed all of the grantors’ interests except the specific life reservation to Susan	Deed did not clearly except or reserve the disputed royalties; "subject to" served to protect warranty, not to carve out those interests
Whether the phrase "in addition to the above exceptions" demonstrates an exception of the disputed royalties	That phrase ties the prior "subject to" clause to an exception of the disputed royalties	The phrase is too general and, without specific reference to the prior deeds or interests, cannot create an exception	Phrase insufficient to show a clear exception; cannot infer exception without specific reference
Whether a reservation/exception may be implied from the deed’s language	Grantors’ intent to preserve children’s royalty shares supports an implied exception	Reservations by implication are disfavored; exceptions/reservations must be clear and specific	Court refused to imply a reservation; reservations require clear, specific language
Whether extrinsic/parol evidence may be used to vary the deed’s plain meaning	Extrinsic evidence about family intent and past practice shows grantors intended to reserve/except the royalties	Deed is unambiguous on its face; parol evidence is barred to contradict a clear integrated instrument	Parol evidence inadmissible because deed is unambiguous and conveys all grantors’ interests except the explicit life reservation

Key Cases Cited

Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017) (deed construction: unambiguous deed is a question of law; ascertain intent from four corners)
Gonzalez v. Janssen, 553 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018) ("subject to" language does not necessarily create exception/reservation; grantee presumptively takes greatest estate instrument allows)
Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1952) (courts disfavor reservations by implication)
Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) (ambiguity is a question of law for the court)
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, 556 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. 2018) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. 2009) (when both parties move on same issue court may render judgment that plaintiff takes nothing)
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2003) (summary judgment standards)