Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC
A144268
| Cal. Ct. App. | Aug 10, 2017Background
- Martins Beach is reachable only via Martins Beach Road from Highway 1; the site lacked lateral land access.
- Martins Beach 1, LLC and Martins Beach 2, LLC purchased the property (including the road) in 2008 and permitted public access for a time, then permanently closed the gate in 2009, posted "BEACH CLOSED" signs, and stationed security.
- Surfrider Foundation sued, alleging the closure constituted "development" under the Coastal Act (Pub. Res. Code §§ 30000–30900) requiring a coastal development permit (CDP); the trial court agreed and issued an injunction restoring access to the level that existed at purchase pending CDP resolution.
- Appellants litigated takings and related constitutional defenses; they also previously sued the County and Coastal Commission but were ordered to pursue administrative process first.
- The trial court awarded Surfrider declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5; appellants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Surfrider) | Defendant's Argument (Martins Beach LLCs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Does closing public access constitute "development" under § 30106 of the Coastal Act? | Closing access is a "change in the intensity of use of water, or of access thereto," thus falls within the Act's broad definition of development. | Simple acts (closing gate, signs) are not traditional "development"; section 30106 should be limited to physical alterations or incidents affecting established public access rights. | Yes. The court applied the plain language and liberal construction of the Act and held the closure is "development." |
| 2. Is the takings challenge to the Coastal Act's CDP requirement ripe for review? | N/A (Surfrider argues claim is premature) | The permit requirement itself effects an uncompensated taking; constitutional review is appropriate now. | Not ripe. A regulatory takings claim requires a final administrative decision on a CDP application before judicial review. |
| 3. Did the trial court's injunction ordering temporary reopening constitute a per se (categorical) taking? | N/A (Surfrider defends injunction as enforcement of permitting scheme and preserving public access) | The injunction effects a physical taking by depriving owners of their right to exclude; it is a per se taking requiring compensation. | No per se taking. The injunction is a temporary intrusion (not a permanent easement); therefore it is not automatically a categorical taking. Appellants did not pursue Penn Central or other multifactor takings analysis, so reversal was denied. |
| 4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees under CCP § 1021.5? | The action vindicated important public coastal access rights, conferred a public benefit, and private enforcement was necessary. | The suit benefited only a single parcel and duplicated government enforcement; fees were inappropriate. | No abuse of discretion. The court found the statutory fee criteria satisfied and affirmed the fee award. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.4th 783 (discussing liberal construction of "development" under the Coastal Act)
- Gualala Festivals Committee v. California Coastal Com., 183 Cal.App.4th 60 (broad definition of development can include nonphysical activities)
- Surfrider Foundation v. California Coastal Com., 26 Cal.App.4th 151 (Coastal Act public access and recreational policies construed broadly)
- Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com., 17 Cal.4th 1006 (ripeness requirement for takings challenges to regulatory decisions)
- Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida D.E.P., 560 U.S. 702 (whether judicial action can constitute a taking; plurality and concurrences analyzed)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (permanent physical occupation is a categorical taking)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (permanent easement exactions and nexus requirement)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (exactions must satisfy rough proportionality)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (multifactor regulatory takings analysis)
- Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (temporary invasions and multifactor takings considerations)
- Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 151 (California cases reconciling permanency and temporary-invasion takings jurisprudence)