14 Cal. App. 5th 238
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2017Background
- Martins Beach is privately owned and reachable only via Martins Beach Road from Hwy 1 in San Mateo County; prior owners historically permitted public daytime access (often for a fee).
- Appellants (Martins Beach 1, LLC and Martins Beach 2, LLC) bought the property in July 2008 and closed public access in 2009 by locking a gate, posting signs, painting over an access billboard, and stationing security.
- Surfrider Foundation sued, alleging the closure constituted "development" under the Coastal Act (Pub. Res. Code §§ 30000–30900) requiring a coastal development permit (CDP); trial court agreed and enjoined appellants to restore access to the level existing at purchase until resolution of any CDP process.
- Appellants raised constitutional takings challenges to the Coastal Act’s permitting requirement and claimed the injunction was a per se taking; they also appealed the award of attorney fees to Surfrider under CCP § 1021.5.
- The appellate court affirmed: (1) closing public access is "development" under § 30106; (2) the takings challenge to the permit scheme is not ripe; (3) the injunction is not a per se taking; and (4) the fee award was within the trial court’s discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Surfrider) | Defendant's Argument (Martins Beach LLCs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellants' closure of access is "development" under the Coastal Act (§ 30106) | Closure decreases intensity of public access to the water and thus is development requiring a CDP | Ordinary acts (closing a gate, painting a sign) are not "development"; statute should be limited to changes affecting established public rights | Held: acts fall within § 30106 ("change in the intensity of use of water, or of access thereto"); definition interpreted broadly and liberally to effectuate Coastal Act goals |
| Ripeness of takings challenge to the CDP permit requirement | Permit requirement effects an unconstitutional taking now; challenge ripe for adjudication | Permit-based takings claims are unripe until a final administrative decision on a permit application | Held: not ripe—landowner must seek final administrative decision (or show denial/compensation context) before judicial takings claim proceeds |
| Whether trial court injunction requiring restoration of prior access is a per se physical taking | Injunction forces appellants to surrender exclusion right; constitutes a per se physical (judicial) taking requiring compensation | Injunction is temporary, enforces statutory permitting process, and is not a permanent physical occupation; thus not a per se taking | Held: injunction intrudes on exclusion right but is temporary; under Loretto/Nollan/Dolan permanency matters—temporary intrusion is not a per se taking; appellants did not pursue Penn Central multifactor analysis, so injunction stands |
| Whether Surfrider was entitled to attorney fees under CCP § 1021.5 | Litigation vindicated important public interest (coastal access), conferred a public benefit, and private enforcement was necessary | Claims that government agencies had already been enforcing/that Surfrider acted to further its mission undermining private-attorney-general award | Held: trial court did not abuse discretion—fee award appropriate (case produced precedent and enforcement had not been pursued effectively by public agencies) |
Key Cases Cited
- Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.4th 783 (Cal. 2012) (Coastal Act "development" definition construed broadly and Act must be liberally construed)
- Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal.3d 561 (Cal. 1984) (legislative findings and goals of the Coastal Act)
- Gualala Festivals Comm. v. California Coastal Com., 183 Cal.App.4th 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (expansive interpretation of "development"; even atypical activities can be development)
- Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com., 17 Cal.4th 1006 (Cal. 1998) (ripeness principle for regulatory takings requires a final administrative decision)
- Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (U.S. 2010) (Supreme Court divided on judicial takings; courts cannot eliminate established property rights without constitutional limits)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1982) (permanent physical occupation is a categorical taking)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1987) (government-demanded permanent easement as permit condition can be a per se taking unless nexus/rough proportionality exist)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (U.S. 1994) (exaction must satisfy "rough proportionality")
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (multifactor ad hoc test for regulatory takings)
- Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (U.S. 2012) (temporary physical invasions/flooding analyzed with multifactor inquiry; time is relevant)
- Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 151 (Cal. 2016) (California Supreme Court on temporary intrusions and Loretto permanency requirement)