Surender Malhan v. Secretary United States Depart, 938 F.3d 453

Background

In 2011 New Jersey family court awarded Alina Myronova custody and ordered Surender Malhan to pay child and spousal support; initial support totaled about $6,000/month.
Malhan later obtained joint custody and the family court found Myronova owed him money, but the court refused to recalculate his ongoing support obligations until a final divorce decree.
By 2016 Myronova’s income rose to >$100,000 while Malhan earned about $60,000, yet Malhan still paid $3,000/month; he briefly stopped paying, accrued arrears, and faced wage garnishment and an administrative levy of his bank account.
Malhan sued state officials in federal court asserting: (Count 2) improper disclosure and administrative levy violating 42 U.S.C. § 669a (CSEA/Title IV‑D); (Count 5) due process violations by denying offsets/counterclaims; and (Count 6) unlawful garnishment in violation of the CSEA and the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
The District Court dismissed on Rooker–Feldman (lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction) and Younger abstention grounds; it also dismissed other counts (including a Count alleging no private right under the CSEA).
The Third Circuit held the District Court erred: Rooker–Feldman did not bar review of these interlocutory/state‑proceeding claims and Younger abstention did not require dismissal of Counts 2, 5, and 6; it affirmed dismissal of certain other counts and remanded Counts 2, 5, and 6 for merits proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Rooker–Feldman bar federal jurisdiction over claims attacking interlocutory family‑court orders and enforcement actions?	Malhan argued his claims challenge state court actions and federal statutes and are not appeals of a final state judgment.	New Jersey argued federal review is barred because Malhan seeks to overturn family‑court determinations.	Rooker–Feldman does not bar review: interlocutory orders here are not "judgments" for §1257 purposes and state proceedings have not ended.
Should the federal court abstain under Younger from adjudicating claims that arise from ongoing family‑court enforcement (agency levies, debt enforcement)?	Malhan contended his challenges—especially to executive levy actions—are not the sort of unique state‑court orders that Younger's exceptional categories protect.	New Jersey argued Younger requires abstention because of ongoing state proceedings and important state interests in family‑law enforcement.	Younger did not mandate abstention for Counts 2 and 5: the challenged levy and debt enforcement are executive tools, not the uniquely judicial orders Younger covers.
Is a threatened or vacated garnishment (Count 6) subject to Younger abstention, barring federal relief?	Malhan sought prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against future garnishment, arguing no pending state proceeding required abstention.	New Jersey relied on family‑court enforcement interest and prior garnishment to argue abstention.	Younger was inapplicable: the garnishment was threatened/vacated (not pending), so federal court could hear Count 6 for prospective relief.
Does the CSEA (Title IV‑D) create a private right of action (as alleged in Count 3)?	Malhan argued he could obtain relief (e.g., declaratory relief) under federal statutes and the Declaratory Judgment Act.	State argued the CSEA does not confer an individual private right enforceable in federal court.	The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal: the Declaratory Judgment Act is remedial only and the CSEA provision challenged does not provide an individual enforceable private right.

Key Cases Cited

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (establishes that federal district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to review state court judgments)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (clarifies limits on federal review of state court determinations in bar admission context)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (confines Rooker–Feldman to cases where federal plaintiffs complain of injuries caused by state‑court judgments rendered before federal proceedings)
Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (articulates practical‑finality approach for when interlocutory state orders qualify as Rooker–Feldman "judgments")
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013) (narrows Younger abstention to three exceptional categories and limits application of Middlesex factors)
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (example of Younger abstention when state proceedings are pending and federal intervention would interfere)
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (abstention required where contempt orders were pending and federal relief would impede state court functions)
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (earlier test for Younger abstention, later limited by Sprint)
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (framework for determining whether federal statutory provisions create individual rights enforceable in federal court)
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (permits rare, exceptional abstention to avoid duplicative or piecemeal litigation)