351 Conn. 75
Conn.2025Background
- Plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, discovered through genetic testing that they are half-siblings sharing a biological father: Dr. Narendra B. Tohan, the reproductive endocrinologist who performed in vitro fertilization (IVF) for their parents.
- They allege Dr. Tohan used his own sperm without parental consent during IVF, causing them physical and emotional harm, including mental anguish and compromised familial relationships.
- Plaintiffs sued under multiple theories including negligence, fraudulent concealment, and lack of informed consent; this summary focuses on the negligence claims.
- The trial court struck the negligence claims, concluding they sounded in noncognizable "wrongful life" rather than ordinary negligence, and entered judgment for the defendant.
- Plaintiffs appealed, arguing their claims are for ordinary negligence, not wrongful life, and thus should proceed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut took the appeal directly.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do plaintiffs' claims sound in ordinary negligence or wrongful life? | Claims allege direct harm from doctor’s deception, not simply harm from existence; not seeking "nonexistence" remedy | Claims constitute noncognizable "wrongful life" because harm alleged could only be avoided by plaintiffs' not being born | Ordinary negligence; court reverses trial court and allows claims to proceed |
| Does Dr. Tohan owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs? | Plaintiffs are readily identifiable victims; harm was foreseeable | Defendant owed no duty to plaintiffs as there was no doctor-patient relationship | Duty of care exists due to foreseeability and direct connection |
| Calculation of damages: Must plaintiffs prove injury compared to nonexistence? | Plaintiffs seek compensation for specific, preventable injuries, not for having been born | Damages are immeasurable because remedy would require comparing existence with nonexistence | Damages can be measured; no need to compare to nonexistence |
| Should the motion to strike be granted as to negligence claims? | No; claims are legally sufficient as ordinary negligence | Yes; as wrongful life claims, they are not legally cognizable | No; motion to strike denied for negligence claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Lynch v. State, 348 Conn. 478 (Conn. 2024) (Distinguishes wrongful life from direct negligence, finding medical malpractice claim where harm is directly caused by defendant)
- Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253 (Conn. 1982) (Connecticut recognizes wrongful birth but not wrongful life claims)
- Maldonado v. Flannery, 343 Conn. 150 (Conn. 2022) (Plaintiff can recover damages for all injuries caused by tortfeasor's negligence)