Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Florida, 8 F.4th 1198

In 2018 Florida voters adopted a constitutional amendment (Art. X, § 32) prohibiting gambling on greyhound racing but leaving penalties and enforcement to the legislature.
Greyhound-racing business owners sued Florida officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaration that § 32 is unconstitutional and an injunction barring enforcement; after initial dismissal they refiled against only the Attorney General (AG).
The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding the AG lacked authority to enforce § 32; plaintiffs appealed.
While this appeal was pending the Florida Legislature enacted S.B. 4A and S.B. 8A: S.B. 4A creates an independent gaming commission; S.B. 8A assigns civil penalties and directs enforcement to agencies other than the AG and creates criminal penalties effective Oct. 1, 2021.
The Eleventh Circuit assumed injury-in-fact but held plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because their alleged harms were not traceable to the AG and would not be redressed by a judgment against her; the court affirmed dismissal without prejudice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Traceability — can plaintiffs’ injuries be traced to the AG?	AG participated in CRC that proposed § 32 and thus caused plaintiffs’ injury.	AG lacks statutory or actual authority to enforce § 32 and never threatened enforcement.	No — injuries are not fairly traceable to the AG.
Traceability — indirect enforcement authority	AG supervises officials (Statewide Prosecutor, state attorneys, FDLE) who could enforce § 32, so AG is effectively responsible.	Any enforcement by those officials is speculative; no threat or likelihood of AG-directed enforcement.	No — speculative supervisory links do not establish traceability.
Redressability — would injunction against AG remedy injuries?	An injunction barring the AG would help by preventing enforcement and influence other officials.	Relief against AG would bind only her; other non-parties remain free to enforce § 32; statute would remain on the books.	No — injunctive relief against AG would not likely redress plaintiffs’ injuries.
Ex ante theory — role in enactment (CRC) creates standing	AG’s participation in CRC that proposed amendment caused plaintiffs’ harm.	Role in drafting or proposing legislation does not equate to enforcement authority; voters enacted the amendment.	No — drafting role does not satisfy traceability.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury, traceability, redressability)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized)
Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.) (official must have enforcement authority for standing in pre-enforcement suit)
Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 944 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.) (plaintiffs’ injury not traceable to AG lacking enforcement power)
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (speculative chain of possibilities insufficient for standing)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (courts may address jurisdictional thresholds in any order)
Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.) (no standing where AG disavowed intent to enforce law)
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (redressability requires relief within the court’s power, not merely persuasive effect of opinion)
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (allows prospective relief against state officials who enforce unconstitutional statutes)