Suniverse v. Encore Credit, 21-20072

In 2006 Carol Reed obtained a $528,000 home-equity loan secured by a deed of trust; Encore was the original lender and the loan was later assigned (U.S. Bank is the current note owner; Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS) has serviced the loan since 2013).
SPS issued a Notice of Default on November 4, 2014 and a Notice of Acceleration on May 21, 2015 declaring the debt due and advising of foreclosure.
SPS filed for expedited foreclosure in state court in 2017 but never completed a foreclosure sale.
On March 12, 2019 SPS sent a written Notice of Rescission of Acceleration under Texas law; SPS later sent a payoff/repayment offer (March 13, 2019) and a new Notice of Acceleration (March 28, 2019), but no payments or acceptance occurred and no sale took place.
Reed conveyed the property to Harris Houston Homes (Jan. 2018), which conveyed it to Suniverse LLC (May 2018); Suniverse sued on May 28, 2019 seeking declaratory relief, quiet title, and equitable redemption.
The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants; Suniverse appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether lender's March 12, 2019 written notice rescinded prior May 21, 2015 acceleration so limitations did not bar foreclosure	Rescission was ineffective and the 4-year limitations period expired, barring foreclosure	The March 12, 2019 written Notice of Rescission complied with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.038 and withdrew the prior acceleration	Court held the written rescission was valid and timely; statute of limitations did not bar Defendants
Whether subsequent mortgage statements/offers after the rescission revived acceleration or created a genuine fact issue	Post-rescission statements and repayment offer show intent to continue to accelerate and foreclose, undermining rescission	The post-rescission statements/offers did not unequivocally manifest revival of acceleration and cannot defeat a statutory written rescission	Court held those communications insufficient to revive acceleration; rescission stands

Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2012) (summary-judgment standard)
Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001) (acceleration begins default when note contains optional acceleration clause)
Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1991) (notice of intent to accelerate/acceleration must be clear and unequivocal)
Boren v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 807 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 2015) (statutory rescission under § 16.038 is a best practice to effectuate abandonment of acceleration)
Sexton v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., [citation="731 F. App'x 302"] (5th Cir. 2018) (lender conduct can constitute abandonment of acceleration; abandonment must be unequivocal)
Thompson v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022 (5th Cir. 2015) (unequivocal manifestation required to show abandonment of acceleration)