Summit School, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Department of Education
108 A.3d 192
Pa. Commw. Ct.2015Background
- Summit Academy (a licensed residential school for adjudicated youth) contracted with Butler Area School District to provide education to nonresident adjudicated students housed at the Academy.
- Under a Department of Education Basic Education Circular, host districts may contract with other providers and charge home districts (or the Department for wards) tuition as determined by Section 2561 of the School Code.
- For 1999–2001 the Department reimbursed the host district at 150% of its tuition rate; beginning in 2003 it paid only 100%, asserting the higher payments were erroneous.
- Academy sued for declaratory relief, seeking payment at 150% under Section 2561(6); parties agreed there were no material factual disputes and moved for summary relief.
- The dispositive statutory phrase was whether Section 2561(6) requires the host district to ‘‘administer and deliver’’ services itself (per Department) or allows the host district to contract for those services and still charge 150% (per Academy).
- The court found the statute ambiguous, construed legislative intent, rejected adding the word "itself," and held the 150% rate applies whenever the student is educated at the institution regardless of whether the host district or a contractor provides the instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 2561(6) requires the host district to personally provide (with its own staff) education to charge 150% | The host district may "administer and deliver" via contract; the statute focuses on location of instruction, not identity of provider | The host district must itself administer and deliver services (i.e., provide instruction with its own resources); otherwise "itself" would be implied | Held for plaintiff: 150% applies when education occurs at the institution even if provided by a third party under contract; court will not add "itself" to statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Colville v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 926 A.2d 424 (Pa. 2007) (statutory interpretation focuses on legislative intent)
- Department of Education v. Empowerment Board of Control of Chester-Upland School District, 938 A.2d 1000 (Pa. 2007) (administrative interpretation of statute afforded deference unless clearly erroneous)
- Burke ex rel. Burke v. Independence Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2014) (court cannot add language to statute)
- Shafer Electric & Construction v. Mantia, 96 A.3d 989 (Pa. 2014) (courts should not impose requirements the legislature omitted)
- Warrantech Consumer Products Services, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co. in Liquidation, 96 A.3d 346 (Pa. 2014) (defines statutory ambiguity standard)
- Capital Academy Charter School v. Harrisburg School District, 934 A.2d 189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (statutes should be construed to avoid absurd results)
- Commonwealth v. Western Maryland R.R. Co., 105 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1954) (sovereign estoppel principles)
- Department of Environmental Resources v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 581 A.2d 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (agency cannot be estopped from performing statutory duties)