Summit Petroleum Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
690 F.3d 733
6th Cir.2012Background
- EPA determined Summit’s sweetening plant and sour gas wells constitute a single stationary source under Title V, based on adjacency despite noncontiguity; Summit argues adjacency requires physical proximity, not mere functional interdependence.
- Facilities are widely dispersed over about 43 square miles with no shared boundaries between wells and the plant; only a dedicated underground pipeline connects them.
- Wehrum Memorandum guided proximity-focused adjacency but was later withdrawn; McCarthy Memorandum shifted to a three-factor test (control, proximity/adjacency, industrial grouping).
- EPA’s final determination in 2009–2010 treated proximity plus interrelation as sufficient for adjacency; Summit challenged this as inconsistent with plain text and regulatory history.
- Court vacated the EPA’s single-source conclusion and remanded to reassess aggregation under the plain-meaning adjacency standard, i.e., physically adjacent properties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the term 'adjacent' ambiguous in Title V aggregation? | Summit: unambiguous; proximity is required. | EPA: ambiguous; proximity plus functional interdependence relevant. | Unambiguous; agency erred in treating functional relatedness as adjacency. |
| Did EPA properly interpret adjacency to permit aggregation due to interrelatedness? | Interrelatedness cannot substitute for physical proximity. | Interrelatedness informs proximity in boundary cases. | Unreasonable interpretation; vacate and remand. |
| Should EPA defer to its own regulatory history and guidance? | Deference to longstanding EPA practice supports Summit. | Agency history shows flexibility; McCarthy Memo governs case-by-case. | No final deference; interpretation inconsistent with plain text and history. |
| Was EPA’s approach consistent with governing regulatory framework? | Aggregation should reflect plain adjacency on physically adjacent properties. | Agency can consider proximity plus interrelation per Title V framework. | Vacate and remand for reassessment under plain-meaning adjacency. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir.1979) (instructed definition of stationary source to reflect proximity and ownership to approximate a 'plant')
- Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (U.S. 2006) (adjacent not ambiguous between physically abutting and nearby; proximity context matters)
- United States v. St. Anthony R.R. Co., 192 U.S. 524 (U.S. 1904) (adjacency defined by physical proximity; context limited)
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1997) (deference to agency interpretations of regulations when not plainly erroneous)
- Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2000) (limits deference when regulation language is unambiguous)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (U.S. 1983) (requires rational connection between facts and agency choices)
- Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (U.S. 2004) (deference to agency interpretation of regulations with longstanding interpretation)