Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC v. Kent Kasischke, 14 N.W.3d 119

Summit Carbon Solutions (Summit) is developing a multistate carbon dioxide pipeline to transport and sequester CO₂ from ethanol plants, with a proposed route through Hardin County, Iowa.
Kent Kasischke, a landowner along the proposed route, denied Summit’s surveyors access to his property for preliminary surveys required before construction.
Summit sought and obtained an order from the Iowa District Court granting temporary access under Iowa Code § 479B.15, which authorizes pipeline companies to enter private land for surveys after providing statutory notice.
Kasischke appealed, making a facial constitutional challenge to the statute under federal and state “takings” clauses and challenging whether Summit qualified as a pipeline company under the statute.
The district court found for Summit on all issues, and the Iowa Supreme Court retained the appeal.

Issue	Kasischke's Argument	Summit's Argument	Held
Is Iowa Code § 479B.15 facially unconstitutional as a taking?	Statute allows uncompensated entry, violating right to exclude under the Takings Clauses.	Survey access is a background restriction, not a new taking, and is allowed by longstanding law.	Not unconstitutional; survey access is a longstanding background restriction.
Does Summit qualify as a "pipeline company" under § 479B.15?	Supercritical CO₂ is not “hazardous liquid;” Summit not entitled to access as a pipeline company.	Supercritical CO₂ is treated as liquid and hazardous by science and industry; statutory definitions satisfied.	Summit qualifies as a pipeline company; supercritical CO₂ is a hazardous liquid.
Did Summit comply with statutory notice requirements?	Summit failed to notify a purported tenant and the notice to Kasischke was not proven.	Strictly complied: gave notice by restricted certified mail as required, to owner and identified parties.	Notice requirements were met; Kasischke not credible about lack of notice or tenancy.
Is proof of irreparable harm required for injunction?	Statute does not override equity; injunction needs substantial injury and lack of adequate remedy.	Statute allows injunction upon meeting statutory criteria, no need for irreparable harm.	Statute allows injunction based on statutory criteria alone; no further showing required.

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021) (California labor regulation requiring union organizer access to private property found to be a per se taking, but with explicit exceptions for longstanding background restrictions).
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (sets framework for regulatory takings analysis; referenced as distinguishable from physical invasion takings).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (explains longstanding background restrictions as pre-existing limitations on property).