Sullivan v. Town of Southampton, 3:16-cv-12023

Background

Regina Shea‑Sullivan worked for the Town of Southampton as an administrative assistant and served intermittently as Interim Town Administrator from 2011–2014; she lacked a college degree.
Edward Cauley, former Highway Superintendent and later a Select Board member, allegedly made four unwanted sexual advances toward Shea‑Sullivan between 2008–2010; she reported those incidents to Town officials before 2013.
After the reports, Cauley joined the Select Board (2012) and opposed extensions, raises, and job‑description changes favorable to Shea‑Sullivan; she was not selected for the permanent TA position in 2013–2014.
Shea‑Sullivan filed written complaints with the Select Board in Sept. 2013, Jan. 2014 and Feb. 2014 alleging harassment, defamation, and retaliation; independent investigations were conducted.
Shea‑Sullivan sued (state court, removed) asserting eleven counts; the federal counts were (Count VII) § 1983 claims (free speech, equal protection, due process) and (Count X) a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, both alleged only against Cauley in his individual capacity.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the federal claims; the district court granted summary judgment for Cauley on Counts VII and X and remanded the remaining state claims to state court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cauley is individually liable under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations arising from Board actions after Aug 18, 2013	Shea‑Sullivan contends Cauley’s post‑complaint conduct (e.g., calling her a “liar,” voting against extensions/raises) amounted to actionable deprivations of speech, equal protection, and due process	Cauley argues he cannot be held individually liable for official actions of a multi‑member board when his single vote was not dispositive and his personal acts did not themselves cause the constitutional deprivations	Court: Grant summary judgment for Cauley — a single board member is not individually liable for board actions absent authority showing his isolated vote produced the deprivation; plaintiff failed to identify actionable individual conduct within the limitations period
Whether Shea‑Sullivan’s § 1983 claims are timely (accrual/continuing violation)	Plaintiff relies on post‑2013 acts and cumulative effects to bring claims within the 3‑year limitations period	Defendants contend the sexual‑advance incidents were time‑barred and post‑2013 acts were discrete and not sufficient to toll or revive earlier discrete acts	Court: Claims accruing from the 2008–2010 incidents are time‑barred; plaintiff did not show a continuing violation that would save those discrete acts; therefore § 1983 claims must rest on acts on/after Aug 18, 2013, which she did not adequately do
Whether § 1985(3) conspiracy claim is viable absent class‑based animus	Shea‑Sullivan alleges a conspiracy motivated by sex and by retaliation for her complaints	Defendants assert § 1985(3) requires class‑based, immutable characteristic animus (e.g., race or sex targeting), not mere retaliation or animus based on conduct	Court: Grant summary judgment for defendants — plaintiff’s allegations show retaliatory animus, not the class‑based sex animus § 1985(3) requires
Whether remand of state claims is appropriate after disposition of federal claims	Plaintiff did not seek dismissal of state claims; defendants sought summary judgment only on federal claims	Defendants requested summary judgment on state claims as well but court did not rule on them	Court: Denied without prejudice summary judgment as to state claims and remanded those counts to state court for further proceedings

Key Cases Cited

Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986) (discusses municipal liability where an official with final authority acts unconstitutionally)
Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2010) (a single member’s isolated acts on a multi‑member board do not create municipal liability)
Mason v. Vill. of El Portal, 240 F.3d 337 (11th Cir. 2001) (same principle regarding multimember boards)
Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121 (1st Cir. 2009) (explains continuing‑violation doctrine does not apply to discrete acts occurring on particular days)
Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118 (1st Cir. 2010) (discrete acts outside the limitations period are time‑barred)
Pérez‑Sánchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 531 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2008) (elements and narrow scope of § 1985(3); requires class‑based animus)
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (limits § 1985(3) to conspiracies motivated by class‑based, invidious discrimination)
Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (a § 1985(3) ‘class’ must be defined by an immutable characteristic, not by conduct)